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No court has ever held that brokers, excess insurers, or reinsurers,
collateral parties to the basic insurer and insured relationship, owe a tort
duty to owners of property and liability insurance policies to monitor the
solvency of primary insurers with whom the collateral parties deal. The
few insureds' of insolvent insurers who have attempted to recover losses
occasioned by insurer insolvency from these collateral parties have been
largely unsuccessful regardless of the tort or contract character of the
action. Nor has a court ever allowed an insured who suffers a loss as a
result of an insurer insolvency to recover from a state for a failure to
properly regulate the solvency of the insurer.
Yet, perhaps the time has come for the judiciary to consider imposing
such a tort duty upon these collateral parties and the states, and to consider
removing barriers to recovery by insureds of insolvent insurers. The
potential benefit from such judicial action is twofold. First, recognition of
a tort duty creates a viable avenue for complete compensation of individual
insureds who have already suffered a loss. Second, and more important, is
the social engineering aspect. The possibility of being held liable provides
a needed incentive to the collateral parties and the states to improve the
present insurer insolvency prevention mechanism such that, in the future,
insureds would receive improved protection from the incidence of
insolvency. 2 Finally, the potential liability would create pressure for more
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville; B.A., Yale University;
J.D., with distinction, Emory University School of Law, 1985.
1 Whenever this Article uses the term "insured," the reader can assume that the
term refers to the insured and any party standing in the shoes of the insured such as a
third party claimant. A third party claimant alleges injury at the hands of the insured
and seeks payment from the insured's liability insurer. References to the 'public" are
generally references to the class of potential third party claimants.
2 The insurance industry is highly active and persuasive with regard to changes in
the regulatory framework of the states. For example, after the Supreme Court in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), held
that the insurance industry was subject to federal regulation, the industry supported
legislation prepared by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
that returned regulatory power to the states. The legislation became law as the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
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economically efficient insolvency prevention.3
Businesses and individuals purchase property and liability insurance to
prevent financial loss. If, by chance, they suffer a destruction of insured
property, the insurance provides monetary recompense. If the insured
becomes liable to another entity, a third party claimant, for a loss the
claimant suffers, insurance usually pays for the loss to the claimant. The
insured may never incur liability and the insured property may never be
damaged, but by purchasing the insurance product, the insured shifts the
risk of the financial consequences of the loss to the insurer and away from
the insured and, in the liability context, away from the injured third party
claimant. 4 In exchange for the premiums paid, the safety net of insurance
allows the insureds to rest, confident that a loss that might fortuitously
befall them will not cause financial ruin.5
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)). For a discussion of the Act, see Lent, McCarran-
Ferguson in Perspective, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 411 (1981). An all-industry committee
cooperated with the NAIC in developing model acts which the groups recommended
that states adopt. The model acts related primarily to rate regulation and by 1950 al
states had enacted rate regulation legislation. See generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW § 8.1, at 931-32 (1988); R. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW § 21[c] (1987); Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate
Regulation: he McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV.
545 (1958).
Another example of the power of the industry is the American Insurance
Association's involvement in developing a federal role in solvency regulation. The
Association is working closely with John D. Dingell, House Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman. See Brostoff, ALA Planning Self-Regulatory Body to Monitor
Company Solvency, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER COMPANY: PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY/EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS EDITION, Nov. 26, 1990, at 1.
3 The tort duty places the burden of monitoring the financial condition of insurers
on the parties who can do so at a lower cost and who can distribute the cost
appropriately. See infra part IV.
4 If the insured is incapable of paying the judgment, the loss rests on the third
party.
5 The purpose of insurance is to provide insureds and the public with security
against financial loss. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 154, 726 P.2d 565, 570
(1986); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 816-17, 620 P.2d 141,
145, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Chavers v.
Nat'l Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981). See INSURING REAL
PROPERTY § 45.01, at 45-3 (S. Cozen, ed. 1989). Liability insurance originated as a
device to protect an individual from financial hardship or ruin due to an adverse
liability judgment. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1177 n.99 (1954); Note, Primary and Excess Insurers and
Their Common Insured: The Triangular Relationship with No Love Lost, 32 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 265, 265-66 (1981). See generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note
2, § 1.1, at 1-5, § 1.3, at 8-15 and K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE,
LEGAL THEORIES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1-2 (1986) (discussing the general raison
d'etre of insurance). Insurance encourages productive investment and, thus, is an
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Unfortunately, more and more frequently, insureds find that the safety
net is a chimera when they discover, after incurring a loss covered by the
terms of the insurance contract, that the loss is not covered because the
insurer is insolvent. The National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds
noted that in 1990 at least twenty-one property and casualty insurers
became insolvent. 6 This number reflects a trend of increasing numbers of
insolvencies in the 1980s and 1990s. 7 According to the Conference, at least
essential feature of the economic system of the United States. K. ABRAHAM,
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 1 (1990). See also, Kimball, The Purpose of
Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45
MINN. L. REV. 471, 478 (1961).
6 See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSOLVENCIES/GUARANTY FUNDS,
(Gastel ed. Jan. 1991) (LEXIS, Inslaw library, Iirpts file, No. 7) [hereinafter Gastel].
The number reflects insurers ordered liquidated in that year. See National Conference
of Insurance Guaranty Funds 1969-1989 Assessment Report, Exhibit 3, June 15, 1990,
noting twenty-three insolvencies in 1989. In contrast, Best's Review noted forty-three
involuntary retirements of property and casualty insurers in 1989. Corporate Changes
1989, BEST'S REVIEW, Mar. 1990, at 20 (Property and Casualty Insurance Edition).
See also Is An Insurance Crisis Next?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1991, at 44.
The insolvency phenomenon exists in other areas of the insurance industry as
well. In 1989, thirty-seven life insurance companies filed for bankruptcy. Weinstein,
Too Risky to Insure?, INVESTMENT VISION, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 25, 26. Because the
life insurance industry and product differ fundamentally from the property and
casualty area, this Article limits discussion to the latter. For a general discussion of the
life insurance industry, see B. HARNETr & I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND
HEALTH INSURANCE § 1.01-.08 (1988).
7 State guaranty funds have paid or will pay for companies becoming insolvent
during 1969 to 1990 as follows:
Year No. of Cos. Year No. of Cos.
1990 21 1979 4
1989 23 1978 6
1988 16 1977 5
1987 11 1976 4
1986 17 1975 22
1985 21 1974 5
1984 20 1973 1
1983 4 1972 2
1982 9 1971 8
1981 6 1970 4
1980 4 1969 1
Gastel, supra note 6, contains the data for 1981 to 1990. THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF INSURANCE GUARANTY FUNDS, STATE INSURANCE GUARANTY
FUNDS AND INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCY ASSESSMENT INFORMATION 1969-
1989 (June 15, 1990) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT REPORT]. Exhibit 4 contains the data
for 1969 to 1980. Guaranty funds exist to pay otherwise covered claims of insolvent
insurers. When insureds and third parties make claims against insolvent insurers, the
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197 property or casualty insurers became insolvent from 1969 to 1989.8
Each of these insolvencies represents thousands of insureds who suffer
losses covered by insurance policies for which those insureds paid
premiums. Because the insurer is insolvent, the insurer lacks the funds to
pay according to its contractual obligations. Once the loss occurs, the
insureds cannot minimize their losses by purchasing other insurance.
In an attempt to protect insureds and the public from insurer
insolvency, 9 each state has a regulatory framework to monitor and regulate
the financial condition of insurers operating within the state. 10 The
incidence of insolvencies calls into doubt the effectiveness of such
regulation. Indeed, a consensus exists that the present regulatory system
needs improvement.1"
guaranty funds pay all or a portion of the qualified claims. See discussion of the
guaranty fund system infra part II.
8 The ASsEsSMENT REPORT, supra note 7, states that guaranty funds have paid
or project to pay claims relating to 197 property and casualty insurers. The report
does not include 1990 insolvencies.
Best's Review notes the following involuntary retirements of property and casualty
insurers:
Year No. of Cos. Year No. of Cos.
1989 43 1983 7
1988 21 1982 3
1987 15 1981 2
1986 26 1980 6
1985 26 1979 9
1984 27
Corporate Changes 1989, supra note 6, at 20.
9 The protection of insureds and third parties, especially in the insolvency
context, recurs as a theme in insurance. See R. JERRY, supra note 2, §§ 20, 22, at 47-
50, 69-73; R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 8.2, at 938-40 (objectives are to
prevent insurer overreaching to assure solvency and to assure equitable rating). See
also WiS. STAT. § 601.01 (1987) (a statutory formulation of purpose); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 679A.140 (Michie 1989).
Professor Kimball has noted that protection of the economic and emotional
interests of insureds occurs through the principle of solidity. See Kimball, supra note
5, at 478.
10 See infra part I.
11 See, e.g., Failed Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies, Report by the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990) [hereinafter Failed Promises]; UNITED
STATES.GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INSURER FAILURES: PROPERTY/CASUALTY
INSURER INSOLVENCIES AND STATE GUARANTY FUNDS (July 1987), GAO/GGD-87-
100 (available from the U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter INSURER
FAILURES]; Freedman, State Solvency Regulation in Jeopardy, BEST'S REVIEW, Jan.
1991, at 91 (Property/Casualty Insurance Edition); Gottheimer, Apocalypse When?,
BEST'S REVIEW, Nov. 1989, at 30, 32 (Property/Casualty Insurance Edition); Dauer,
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In an additional effort to protect insureds and the public, each state has
developed a guaranty fund to pay claims otherwise covered by the contract
with the insolvent insurer. 12 The funds, however, have claim ceilings and
other limitations. 13 The ultimate recovery by the insured can fall short of
the full amount of coverage owed by the insolvent insurer. Thus, state
financial regulation and guaranty funds provide incomplete protection to
insureds.
Should the insured, and in the liability context, the injured third party
claimant, bear the ultimate burden for the loss caused by the insolvency-
the amount of the underlying insured loss which exceeds any possible
guaranty fund recovery? Or should courts require the collateral actors in
the insurance situation or the state to bear the loss?
This Article suggests 'that brokers, excess insurers, reinsurers, and
perhaps state regulators should account in tort to the insured when the
primary insurer becomes insolvent. The form of accountability should be
negligence. To hold a party liable for negligence, the party must breach a
duty owed and that breach must cause provable damages. 14 This Article
argues that modern society will benefit from judicial recognition of a duty
on the part of the collateral parties and the state to monitor the financial
stability of insurers.
This suggestion arises from the following conclusions. First, the
insured deserves compensation and protection. The present regulatory
framework reflects a general policy of protecting the class of insureds from
insurer insolvency, but fails to accomplish its goal. Without such
protection, the economic and emotional value of insurance vanishes. Also,
typical insureds do not know of the need to protect themselves from
potential insurer insolvency and lack the ability and information to do so.
Thus, requiring insureds to protect themselves places the risk on the party
least able to avoid loss. 15
Inconing CPCU President Urges Professionalism, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER
COMPANY: PROPERTY AND CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS EDITION, Oct. 8, 1990,
at 3; Fletcher, Regulators Support NAIC Accreditation, Bus. INS., Dec. 3, 1990, at
12; McIntyre, Report Recommends National Guaranty Fund, Bus. INS., Dec. 3, 1990,
at 18.
12 See infra part II.
13 For example, the Michigan Guaranty Fund does not pay any insured with an
otherwise covered claim if the insured has a net worth of one-tenth of one percent of
the premiums written by insurers in the preceding year. The provision has withstood
challenge. See Borman's Inc. v. Michigan Property & Casualty Guar. Ass'n, 925 F.2d
160 (6th Cir. 1991). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.7925(3) (1990).
14 W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 58, at 164-65 (5th ed.
1984).
15 See infra part IV.
1991] 1079
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Second, imposing the duty to monitor solvency on the collateral parties
is fair and more efficent. Collateral parties know of the possibility of
insolvency and have access to the information and expertise necessary to
monitor solvency. Such monitoring by these parties is more efficent than
monitoring by each insured. Collateral parties can more easily absorb the
loss, can distribute the cost of monitoring to those who benefit from it,
and, can distribute the losses incurred by a failure to abide by the duty. In
addition, collateral parties profit from the insurance relationship. Thus,
courts can fairly require the collateral parties to carry a burden derived
from that benefit. Finally, these collateral parties are highly organized into
powerful groups that can implement and direct modifications in insurer
solvency regulation, an area in desperate need of reform. 16
By statute, the states have a duty to monitor insurer solvency. Courts
should allow insureds to recover on the basis of this duty when the state
has acted negligently and the insured has been injured as a result. State
regulators are appropriate loss bearers because society charges them with
the regulation of insurers to protect the public from insurer insolvency. 17
In addition to preventing a particular insured from being the ultimate
payor in a particular insolvency setting, the potential for tort accountability
should lead brokers, excess insurers, reinsurers and, most importantly, the
state regulators to improve the investigation, monitoring and general
regulation of insurer stability. The potential for tort liability should lead to
increased self-regulation by members of the industry and more effective
government regulation as the industry assumes more of the regulatory
burden. The final regulatory product should be a framework of cooperative
effort on the part of the industry and state regulators. Such improved
scrutiny of solvency, especially with increased involvement by members of
the insurance industry, should help to achieve, eventually, the ultimate goal
of protecting insureds and the public by reducing the number of
insolvencies and eliminating sudden, unforeseen insolvencies.
This Article suggests that tort accountability, by way of a negligence
standard, best suits the insolvent insurer situation. The other actors in the
insolvency situation have an affirmative duty to exercise care in the
monitoring of primary insurer insolvency. Only strict liability guarantees
that insureds do not bear the short-term loss. A negligence standard,
however, protects insureds in the long run by increasing the incentive for
monitoring and detecting insolvencies, and requiring consideration of the
culpability of the individual excess insurer, broker, reinsurer, and state
regulator.
16 Id.
17 See infra part V.
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The author recognizes that suggesting the imposition of tort liability
amounts to a suggestion of judicial activism. However, the proliferation of
insolvencies and the present plight of insureds create an extreme situation.
Such drastic action may constitute the only effective mechanism to spur
appropriate insolvency prevention. Without effective prevention, the
insured suffers economic and emotional loss from an insolvency. In
addition, as insolvencies become more common, insureds as a group suffer
a greater psychological loss in that they cannot purchase peace of mind-
the certainty of recompense no longer exists in their minds. The insurance
industry suffers because the product sold no longer shines with the same
brilliance. This Article does not mandate tort liability; rather, it illustrates
the feasibility and effects of imposing a tort duty on the collateral parties.
The Article begins by discussing, in sections I and II, the present
regulatory protections of state insolvency monitoring and guaranty funds.
Section III reviews the unsympathetic treatment that insureds' actions
against brokers, excess insurers, and reinsurers, respectively, have
received from the courts. Section IV discusses the creation of a tort duty
for each of the collateral actors. Section V discusses the possibility of tort
recovery from the state on the basis of negligent regulation.
I. INSURER INSOLVENCY REGULATION
All jurisdictions recognize that protecting insureds and the public
necessitates monitoring insurer solvency. In fact, states view solvency
regulation of insurers as one of their most important tasks.18 In addition to
18 K. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 93 (1990). See also R.
KEETON & A. WIDiss, supra note 2, § 8.2, at 938-39 (listing the following as the
three main objectives of insurance regulation: (1) Avoiding overreaching by insurers;
(2) assuring solvency; and (3) assuring equitable rating classifications); R. JERRY,
supra note 2, § 22, at 69 (listing (1) ensuring fair prices; (2) protecting solvency; (3)
preventing unfair practices; and (4) guaranteeing the availability of coverage).
Professor Patterson stated: "The chief object in view in creating separate insurance
departments and in delegating to them extensive powers of regulation and investigation
was to protect the public against financially unsound enterprises.. . ." Epton & Bixby,
Insurance Guaranty Funds: A Reassessment, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 227, 229-30 (1976)
(emphasis in original) (citing 1 E. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN
THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 192 (Harv.
Studies in Administrative Law, reprinted 1968)). See also Kimball, The Goals of
Insurance Law: Means Versus Ends, 1962 J. INS. 19. Kimball stated:
If insurance is to do its job-i.e., if it is to insure-then the insurance enterprise,
both in the aggregate and company by company, must be secure and solvent.
Solvency is the most important goal of all insurance law and regulation, though it
.is not always given effect by individual courts or insurance commissioners. But
the goal sought is not solvency in the technical sense, or more accurately,
1991]
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rate regulation, which relates directly to the goal of insurer solvency, 19
states have comprehensive plans for reporting and review of the general
financial status of insurers licensed to do business within their borders. 20
For example, the states require submission of annual financial statements to
the state insurance department. 2 ' State laws usually require detailed
examinations every three to five years. 22 The states require minimum
capital, surpius, and reserve levels and restrict investment by the insurance
companies. 23  In addition, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) 24 administers the Insurance Regulatory Information
technical solvency is not enough to satisfy the needs of the going insurance
institution. There must be a degree and type of solvency that ensures that the
policyholder will continue to be protected in any reasonably foreseeable situation.
Id. at 21.
19 Rate regulation relates to solvency because the state allows an insurer to sell
the insurance product at a reasonable price in light of the cost to the insurer. For a
discussion of rate regulation, see Kimball & Boyce, supra note 2. See also R. KEETON
& A. WIDIss, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 954; 19 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE §§ 10491-10496, at 429-72 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
20 See generally K. ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 93; 19 J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 19, §§ 10431-10432. For an example of a state's plan, see ALA. CODE §§ 27-2-1
to -6-16 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.2-010 to .8-190 (Baldwin 1991); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 679B.010-682B.250 (Michie 1989).
21 See INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-3-26
(1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.3-240 (Baldwin 1991); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 680A.270 (Michie 1989).
22 In Kentucky, for example, each domestic insurer must be examined at least
every four years. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.2-210 (Baldwin 1991). The scope
of the examination in Kentucky includes all documents, records and such relating to
the subject of the examination. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.2-230 (Baldwin
1991). See also ALA. CODE § 27-2-21 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 679B.230
(Michie 1989). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners coordinates
zone review of insurers operating significantly in more than one state. This program
avoids needless duplication. Examiners from the zone states conduct the review. See
INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 11.
23 See INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 11; 19 J. APPLEMAN, supra note
19, §§ 10351-10385. For examples of these requirements, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.3-120 (Baldwin 1991) (capital and surplus); § 304.3-140 (deposits); § 304.6-100
(reserves); § 304.7-030 (investments). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 511 (1990)
(capital); § 513 (deposits); § 1111 (reserves); § 1303 (investments); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 680A.120 (Michie 1989) (capital); § 680A.140 (deposits); § 681B.050
(reserves); § 682A.030 (investments).
24 The NAIC consists of the heads of insurance departments of all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and the four territories. It was developed to encourage
uniformity and cooperation among the states. The NAIC has no statutory or regulatory
authority but serves as a clearinghouse for information, data, and model laws.
INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 8. See also R. JERRY, supra note 2, § 23, at 81.
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System to analyze annual financial data of insurers and report the
information to the states. The system also designates certain insurers for
special attention.2
The incidence of insolvencies casts doubt on the effectiveness of the
present system of oversight. Numerous entities have noted shortcomings in
the present system. 26 The NAIC has completed several studies on the
present regulatory system and has suggested several changes to increase the
sophistication of solvency regulation such as requiring independent
verification of filings.27 In addition, the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the United States House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce released a report in 1990 which severely criticized
the present regulatory system and suggested federal regulation as the
25 See INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 11. The Insurance Regulatory
Information. System (IRIS) develops eleven measures of financial condition from data
regarding premiums received, investment yield, reserves, and surplus. The insurers
furnish the raw data to IRIS. See K. ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 93. The General
Accounting Office has recommended that IRIS be expanded. GAO Report Recommends
Expanded IRIS Program, BEST'S REviEw, Jan. 1991, at 7 (Property/Casualty
Insurance Edition).
26 See, e.g., Failed Promises, supra note 11; INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11;
GAO Report Recommends Expanded IRIS Program, BEST'S REviEw, Jan. 1991, at 7
(Property/Casualty Insurance Edition); Hall, Solvency Monitoring Theme Gathers
More Steam, BEST'S REvIEW, Jan. 1991, at 100 (Property/Casualty Insurance
Edition); Gottheimer, supra note 11, at 30, 32; Regulators Support NAIC
Accreditation, BUSINESS INS., Dec. 3, 1990, at 12.
27 See INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 12-13. In 1974, a McKinsey and
Co., Inc. report indicated serious flaws in the present system such as low quality of
financial reports, lack of communication among the states, infrequent examinations,
and poor resource allocation in choosing the targets of the examinations. Id. at 12. See
Strengthening the Surveillance System: Final Report (McKinsey and Co., Inc. (NAIC)
April 1974). In 1979, the Government Accounting Office found that no significant
progress had been made to improve regulation. Id. See Issues and Needed
Improvements in State Regulation of the Insurance Business (PAD-79-72, Oct. 9,
1979); INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 12 n.2. In April 1981, the NAIC
appointed a Special Joint Committee on Examinations to study the modifications in
regulation made in response to the McKinsey study. The Committee concluded that
state regulation had not moved toward increased effectiveness. Id. The Committee
recommended priority based examinations, annual examinations by certified public
accountants, use of specialists, and continuing education for examiners. Id. at 13. See
also Gottheimer, supra note 11, at 36.
Earl Pomeroy, outgoing President of NAIC, stated in 1990 that regulation could
be improved by having minimum standards for solvency regulation, certification,
independent verification of reports, NAIC direct regulatory support, and regulator
peer review. See Gastel, supra note 6.
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possible answer to the problem of insurer insolvency.28 Noting the lack of
effectiveness of the present system, the American Insurance Association
has explored the idea of more effective self-regulation. 29
In addition to general oversight provisions, states have developed
provisions relating to supervision, rehabilitation, and liquidation of
insurers in dire financial straits.30 If, as a result of general oversight, a
state insurance department determines that an insurer is experiencing
financial difficulties but that the insurer's condition does not require formal
rehabilitation or liquidation, the state insurance Commissioner may directly
supervise the insurer, issuing such orders and performing any other acts
required to remedy the situation.31 Typically, before such supervision may
commence, the Commissioner must have reasonable cause that an insurer
has committed or has engaged in or will commit or engage in, an act that
would make the insurer subject to rehabilitation or liquidation.
Furthermore, the Commissioner must have a reasonable belief that the
continuance of an insurer's business creates a hazard to the public or policy
28 See Failed Promises, supra note 11. The insurance industry has examined the
possibility of federal regulation. See, e.g., Bradford, Insurance Regulation: Support
Begins to Build for Federal Regulatory Role, BUs. INS., Dec. 3, 1990, at 3; Schwartz
& Ballen, Solvency Regulation: A Basket of Options, BEST'S REVIEW, Oct. 1990, at
53 (Property/Casualty Insurance Edition); Neis, Brokers Tackle Market Volatility,
Solvency: National Association of Insurance Brokers Annual Meeting, BEST'S REVIEW,
July 1990, at 141 (Property/Casualty Insurance Edition); Fletcher, NAIC Responds To
Critics: Says State Solvency Regulation is Adequate, Bus. INs., Aug. 6, 1990, at 2;
When Risk Managers Talk..., Bus. INS., Sept. 10, 1990, at 8. For a more academic
discussion of a federal regulatory role, see R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 2, §
8.1(b), at 934.
29 See Bradford, supra note 28.
30 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 27-32-1 to -41 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 20-611
to -648 (1989); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1010 to 1062 (Deering 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 38a-903 to -961 (1991);. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5901 to 5944 (1990); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.33-010 to -600 (Baldwin 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
175, § 180A to 180L (Law. Co-op. 1990); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7401 to 7436 (1990);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-30-1 to -30-305 (1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§§ 221.1 to .63 (1989).
Many of the statutes derive in whole or in part from the INSURERS SUPERVISION,
REHABILITATION AND LIQUIDATION AcT (National Association of Insurance
Commissioners 1969) (LEXIS, Insrlw library, NAIC file) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL
ACT], a model act promulgated by the NAIC in 1969. The NAIC MODEL ACT can be
found at 1978-1 NAIC Proc. 238 (1977). A majority of the states also include the
UNIFORM INSURERS LIQUIDATION ACT (Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws 1939). See generally INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 5,
§ 45.0211], at 45-3 to -5.
31 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-911 (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-110 (Baldwin 1991) (no general supervision discussed); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 221.11 (1989). See also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 9.
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holders.32 The insurer may request a hearing or may apply for immediate
judicial review of the Commissioner's action.33 The supervision generally
lasts sixty days from the initial order of supervision, but the Commissioner
can extend it or commence formal rehabilitation or liquidation. 34
Some jurisdictions allow the Commissioner to seize the insurer's
property and enjoin the continued transaction of business.3 5 The
Commissioner must first obtain a court order based upon a claim that
grounds for an order of formal delinquency exist and delay will injure
policy holders, creditors, or the public.3 6 The seizure order is simply an
interim measure. If the Commissioner fails to pursue liquidation or
rehabilitation after a reasonable period of time, the court will vacate the
seizure order. 37
The Commissioner pursues formal rehabilitation by petitioning the
designated court for an order of rehabilitation if the insurer appears
salvageable and the rehabilitation will not harm interests of creditors,
policy holders, and the public.3 8 Generally, the Commissioner requests
rehabilitation if the continuance of business under present management and
policies appears financially hazardous to the interests of creditors, policy
holders, or the public.3 9 Usually, the Commissioner becomes the
32 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-110 (Baldwin 1991) (requirement for
summary orders; general supervision not discussed); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 221.11 (1989). See also NAIC MODEL ACr, supra note 30, § 9.
33 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-110 (Baldwin 1991) (review of summary
orders); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221.10 (1989). See also NAIC MODEL
ACT, supra note 30, § 9.
34 See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221.11 (1989). See also NAIC MODEL
ACT, supra note 30, § 9.
35 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-912 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5943 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 800.1 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-120 (Baldwin 1991). See also NAIC MODEL ACT supra note 30, § 10.
36 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-912 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5943 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, $ 800.1 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-120 (Baldwin 1991). See also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 10.
37 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5943 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-120 (Baldwin 1991). See also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 10.
38 See, e.g, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-140 (Baldwin 1991); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4356 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 696B.210 (Michie
1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402-C:15 (1989). See generally INSURING REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.04, at 45-13 for a discussion of rehabilitation.
39 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-32-6 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5905
(1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-140 (Baldwin 1991). See also NAIC MODEL
ACT, supra note 30, § 12(a).
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rehabilitator and has the right to control the insurer's assets and conduct
the insurer's business under the general supervision of the court.40
The rehabilitator works with the insurer to eliminate the problematic
condition. 41 When the rehabilitation succeeds, the court and Commissioner
restore the insurer to self-managed operation. 42 If the rehabilitation efforts
fail or if no rehabilitation occurs but an insurer's continued transaction of
business would substantially increase the risk of loss to creditors, policy
holders, or the public, the Commissioner may petition for the insurer's
liquidation. 43 Many states specify insolvency as a particular basis for
liquidation. 44 The states generally deem a company insolvent if assets do
not equal liabilities and required reserves. 45
The Commissioner usually acts as the liquidator and must take
possession of the assets of the insurer and administer them under the
40 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-32-6 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5905
(1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-150, -160 (Baldwin 1991). See also NAIC
MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 13. See generally INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 5, § 45.04131[a], at 45-22 to 45-23.
41 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5910 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-160 (Baldwin 1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221.16 (1989). See
also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 14(b).
42 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5910 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-180(2) (Baldwin 1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221.18 (1989). See
also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 16.
43 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-919(c) (1991); IND. CODE § 27-9-3-6(3)
(1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-180, -190 (Baldwin 1991). See also NAIC
MODEL AcT, supra note 30, §§ 16, 17.
"The business of insurance is affected with a public interest, and the state has an
important and vital interest in the liquidation or reorganization of such a business."
19A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 10621, at 4.
44 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-919(b) (1991); IND. CODE § 27-9-3-6(2)
(1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.33-190, -140 (Baldwin 1991). See also NAIC
MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 17.
Some jurisdictions allow liquidation if the insurer conducts no business in one
year or the insurer has pursued voluntary liquidation. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-32-7
(1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5906 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-37-7 (1990);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-190 (Baldwin 1991) (pursued voluntary liquidation
provision). For a general discussion of voluntary liquidation, see 19A J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 19, § 10622, at 13.
45 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-32-1(1) (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 18, § 5901(1)
(1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-37-2 (1990). See generally 19A J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 19, § 10641, at 40-41 (definitions of insolvency). The NAIC MODEL ACT defines
insolvency as the inability to pay any obligation within thirty days after the due date or
when assets do not exceed liabilities plus the greater of any capital and suplus required
by law or the total par or stated value of its authorized and issued capital stock. See
NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 3(k).
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general supervision of the court.46 The liquidator may request a declaration
of insolvency to trigger the applicable guaranty fund obligations. 47 The
liquidator marshals the assets of the insurer and distributes them.48 In so
doing, the liquidator must give claims of insureds and third party claimants
priority after administrative costs and debts due employees. 49 Of course,
insureds who do not have access to guaranty fund recovery may receive
little from the liquidation proceeding because of the general paucity of
assets.
II. GUARANTY FUNDS
In the late 1960s Congress became concerned about the effects of the
increasing number of liability insurer insolvencies. 50 Though insurance
regulation has historically been the domain of the individual states, 51 the
46 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5911 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-200 (Baldwin 1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221.20 (1989). See
also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 18(a). See generally INSURING REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.05[4], at 45-30.
47 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5911 (1990); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.33-200 (Baldwin 1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221.36 (1989). See
also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 18(d).
48 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-240 (Baldwin 1991); WiS. STAT.
§ 645.46 (1990). See also NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 25. See generally
INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.05[51[dJ,[e], and [f], at 45-41 to 45-
50.
49 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-430 (Baldwin 1991); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 221.44 (1991); WIs. STAT. § 645.68 (1990). See also NAIC
MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 42. Federal bankruptcy law does not apply. See 11
U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) and (d). Section 109(b)(2) provides that Chapter 7 of the
bankruptcy code does not apply to a domestic or foreign insurance company. Section
109(d) states that Chapter 11 does not apply if the entity was not a debtor under
Chapter 7.
50 Congress became concerned about the insolvency of "high risk" automobile
liability insurers and, in 1965, a United States Senate Subcommittee investigated the
issue. See High-Risk Automobile Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S 3919 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965). Senator Thomas Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, noted at hearings that these insolvencies prevented innocent
victims from being compensated. Id. See also Note, Insurance Company Insolvencies
and Insurance Guaranty Funds: A Look at the Nonduplication of Recovery Clause, 74
IOWA L. REV. 927 (1989). See generally INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 26.
51 The McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)), assigned insurance regulation to the
states. Regulating the insurance industry was considered the province of the states
until the Supreme Court, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,
322 U.S. 533 (1944), opened the door to federal regulation of the industry. The
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inaction of the states in counteracting the injustice caused by insurer
insolvency 52 has led several senators to introduce bills designed to establish
a federal guaranty fund to pay claims covered by policies with insolvent
insurers. 53 The threat of federal regulation of a sector of the insurance
industry convinced the NAIC to draft model guaranty fund legislation. 54
The states quickly embraced the model legislation, and by 1972, forty-five
states had in place guaranty funds similar to that espoused in the model
legislation. 55 By 1981 virtually all stateshad some form of guaranty fund
for property and casualty insurers.56
McCarran-Ferguson Act, responding to that decision, closed the door on general
federal regulation. See K. YORK & J. WHELAN, INSURANCE LAW 27-39 (1988). See
also supra note 2.
.52 A few states created property and casualty guaranty funds prior to 1965.
INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 26. See also Epton & Bixby, supra note 18, at
227-30.
53 In 1966, Senator Thomas Dodd introduced a bill to create a federal guaranty
fund 'for automobile, insurers. See S. 3919, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Senator
Warren Magnuson introduced a bill in 1969 to create a federal guaranty fund for all
property and casualty insurers. See S. 2236, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (Federal
Insurance Guaranty Corporation bill paralleling the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company). The 1969 bill received a favorable recommendation from the Senate
Committee on Commerce. See S. Rep. No. 91-1421, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See
generally INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 26; Epton & Bixby, supra note 18, at
230.
54 See Epton & Bixby, supra note 18, at 230; INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11,
at 27. The states and the insurance industry feared that once the federal government
regulated an area of the industry, it would be more likely to regulate other areas in the
future. The result would be two tiers of regulation. Epton & Bixby, supra note 18, at
230. The motivational effect of the federal regulatory threat is apparent. In May of
1969, the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, a major trade association, strongly
opposed any form of guaranty fund. However, in November of 1969, that same
association strongly supported state guaranty funds. Compare DOT's Study of
Automobile Accident Compensation: Hearings on S. 2236 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1969) (statement of American Mutual Insurance
Alliance submitted for the record) with Federal Insurance Guaranty Corporation:
Hearings on S. 2236 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
70-72 (1969) (testimony of Andre Masionpierre, vice president of American Mutual
Insurance Alliance).
The model act is known as the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS STATE POST ASSESSMENT INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION
MODEL ACT (National Association of Insurance Commissioners 1970) [hereinafter
GUARANTY MODEL ACT]. The Act is found at 1970-1 NAIC Proc. 253 (1970). See
generally INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.07, at 45-62.
55 See Epton & Bixby, supra note 18, at 230. See also Note, supra note 50.
56 See INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 27. See also INSURING REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.07, at 45-62 to 45-67. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 27-42-
1 to -42-20 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.80.010-.190 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
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Property and casualty guaranty funds pay claims covered by the
policies of the insolvent 57 member insurer. There are, however, limitations
on the obligations of the various funds. Most funds have a maximum
statutory limit for any one claim.58 Generally, the funds pay only those
claims which arose before the insolvency determination or within thirty
ANN. §§ 20-661 to -695 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-90-101 to -123 (1990);
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1063-1063.14 (Deering 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-501 to
-250 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-836 to -853 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 4201-4221 (1990); FLA. STAT. §§ 631.50-.70 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-36-1
to -18 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:16-101 to -219 (1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-
3601 to -3621 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 11065.82 (1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-6-8-1 to -19 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE §§ 515B.1-.26 (1989); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-2901 to -2919 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.36-010 to -170
(Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1375-:1394 (West 1990); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 24-A, §§ 4431-4451 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 504-519 (1990);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175D, §§ 1-16 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 500.7901-.7949
(1990); MINN. STAT. §§ 60C.01-.20 (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 83-23-101 to -137
(1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-10-101 to -117 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-
2401 to -2418 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 687A.010-.160 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 404-B:1-:18 (1983); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 17:30A-1 to -20 (1990); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-43-1 to -18 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-12-1 to -20 (1990);
N.D.- CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-42-01 to -15 (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3955.01-.21 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 2001-2020 (1990); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 734.510-.710 (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1701.101-.605
(1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-34-1 to -18 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-31-10 to -
170 (Law. Co-op 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-29A-1 to -53 (1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-12-101 to -119 (1990); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28-C
§§ 1-22 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-28-201 to -221 (1990); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3611-3626 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-1600 to -1623 (1990);
WASH REV. CODE §§ 48.32.010-.930 (1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 33-26-1 to -19
(1990); Wis. STAT. §§ 646.01-.73 (1990); WYO. STAT. §§ 26-31-101 to -117 (1990).
57 Many jurisdictions require that the insurer be in liquidation and insolvent
before the guaranty fund's duties arise. See, e.g, ALA. CODE § 27-42-5(5) (1990);
FLA. STAT. § 631.54(6) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 1065.84-4 (1988); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.36-050(4) (Baldwin 1991); MINN. STAT. § 60C.03(8)
(1990). Other jurisdictions require that there be a determination of insolvency
regardless of a liquidation proceeding. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-661(5)
(1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-838(7) (1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175D,
§ 1(4) (Law. Co-op. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30A-5(e) (1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-12-104(5) (1990).
58 Many states have a per-claim limit. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.80.060
(1990) ($500,000); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 1065.87-2 (1988) ($300,000); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1701.201(b)(1)(i) (1989) ($300,000). New York has a
limit of $1,000,000. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 7603(a)(2). Other states have much lower
limits. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-42-8(1)(8) (1990) ($150,000); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-667(b) (1989) ($100,000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.36-080(a)
(Baldwin 1991) ($100,000).
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days after the insolvency determination. 59 Some states have deductible
amounts60 and others refuse payment if the claimant has a certain net
worth. 61 To recover, the claimant must reside in the guaranty fund state. 62
An insurer must be a member of the state guaranty fund to be licensed to
transact business within the state in the insurance lines covered by the
guaranty fund. 6
3
The fund statutes state the goal of these funds as paying claims without
lengthy delays so that claimants or policyholders do not suffer financial
59 See Arizona Property & Casualty Ins. Guar. Fund v. Helme, 153 Ariz. 129,
735 P.2d 451 (1987) (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-667(c) (1989)). See generally
19A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 10801, at 11 (Supp. 1990).
60 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-42-05(1)(a) ($100); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.32.060(1)(a) (1990) ($100).
61 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-36-3(2)(F) ($3 million) (1990); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 73, 1065.84-3(b)(iv) ($50 million) (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 500.7925(3) (1990) (one-tenth of one percent of the premiums written by insurers in
the preceding year).
62 See GUARANTY MODEL ACT, supra note 54, § 5(b). See also INSURER
FAILURES, supra note 11, at 28; INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 5,
§ 45.07[4][a], at 45-88. For examples of courts dealing with the determination of
"covered claim," see Hardester v. Eubanks, 292 Ark. 610, 731 S.W.2d 780 (1987);
Nianick v. Edgewater Beach Hotel, 28 Ill. App. 3d 33, 328 N.E.2d 82 (1975).
Guaranty funds do not pay other creditors of the insolvent insurer. See
Commissioner of Ins. v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 373 Mass. 798, 370
N.E.2d 1353 (1977). See generally 19A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 10801, at
371. 63 See GUARANTY MODEL ACT, supra note 54, § 5. See also INSURING REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.07[3][], at 45-83. See generally 19A J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 19, § 10801, at 370.
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loss. 64 The statutes also charge the funds with the added responsibility of
preventing and detecting insolvencies. 65
Financing for the funds comes from two sources: assets of the
insolvent insurer and assessments on other solvent insurers. In exchange
for assuming the insolvent insurer's obligation to pay claims, the
claimant's rights against the insurer on the policy are constructively
assigned to the guaranty fund to the extent of the recovery from the fund. 66
The guaranty fund may file a proof of claim with the liquidator of the
insolvent insurer and the claim may have priority over other claims against
the assets of the insolvent insurer to the extent the guaranty fund claims
reimbursement for the reasonable expenses of handling the claims.
Guaranty fund requests for the payment of a claim have the same priority
as the claim discharged. 67 Thus, the guaranty fund recovers after the
insurer's assets pay administrative costs and debts due to employees for
services rendered. 68
64 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-42-2 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4202
(1990); FLA. STAT. § 631.51 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 73, 1065.82 (1988). See
also GUARANTY MODEL AcT, supra note 54, § 2. The "guaranty legislation is an
integral part of an overall scheme to protect claimants, policyholders and the general
public from loss due to the financial instability of insurers." INSURING REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.07[2]. See Lucas v. Illinois Ins. Guar. Fund, 52 Ill.
App. 3d 237, 367 N.E.2d 469 (1977) (intention of the legislature in establishing the
fund was to protect the public from losses arising from insolvency of insurers doing
business in the state); New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Sheeran, 137
N.J. Super. 345, 349 A.2d 92 (1975), cert. denied, 70 N.J. 143, 358 A.2d 190 (1976)
(act must be interpreted to protect the policy holders and claimants and to advance
their interests rather than the interests of the association); O'Malley v. Florida Ins.
Guar. Ass'n, 257 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1971) (the dominant purpose of the association is to
avoid delay and to settle claims as soon as possible). See generally 19A J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 19, § 10801, at 368.
65 See GUARANTY MODEL AT, supra note 54, § 2 and statutes cited supra note
64. See also Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Bernard, 393 So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App.
1980) (association has the right to challenge activities of companies that indicate
insolvency or which will produce insolvency). See generally 19A J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 19, § 10801, at 366.
66 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-42-11 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-844(1)
(1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4211(a) (1990). See also GUARANTY MODEL
ACT, supra note 54, § 11(a).
67 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 631.60 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.36-110
(Baldwin 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4442 (1989). See also NAIC
MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § 42(a); statutes cited supra note 66; supra note 49 and
accompanying text. See generally INSURING REAL PROPERTY, supra note 5,
§ 45.07[3][d], at 45-85.
68 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also INSURING REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.05[51[f][iii], at 45-48.
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To fill the gap between what the guaranty funds pay claimants and the
amount that the funds recover from the liquidation proceeding, the
guaranty funds assess member insurers in proportion to the net direct
written premiums of the member insurer for the calendar year preceding
the assessment. 69 In all states, except New York, the assessment occurs
after insolvency and after the guaranty fund responds to claimants. 70
The guaranty fund framework provides only incomplete protection to
the insureds of an insolvent insurer. The limitations on guaranty fund
coverage leave many insureds with claims covered by the insolvent
insurer's policy but which guaranty funds do not pay in whole or in part.
In this time of high medical costs and large jury verdicts, claims in excess
of the statutory maximum are not unusual.
In addition, the guaranty funds, as they now exist and operate, may not
satisfy the claims that the statutes mandate. Several studies have suggested
that the present funds cannot handle a large scale insolvency. 71 Once again
commentators are evaluating the possibility of a federal guaranty fund as a
way of providing more protection to insureds and the public. 72
To attempt to acquire full recovery, the insured or claimant of the
insolvent insurer may make a claim for the loss not compensated by
guaranty funds against the assets of the insurer in the insolvency
69 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 631.57 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.36-080
(Baldwin 1991). See also GUARANTY MODEL ACT, supra note 54, § 8(1)(c). The Act
states that no member insurer may be assessed in any year an amount greater than two
percent of that member insurer's net direct written premiums for the calendar year
preceding the assessment. See generally Harrison, Insurance Company Insolvencies,
Guaranty Funds and Brokers' Responsibilities, 1975 INS. L.J. 517-19.
70 See statutes cited supra note 69. In New York, the assessment takes place
before the insolvency. The Superintendent of Insurance runs the New York fund and
requires insurers to contribute one-half of one percent of the direct written premiums
each year unless the fund has a certain minimum balance. N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 7603(b)(1), (2). See generally INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 28. Other states
do not like this because they fear that the states will use the money for some other
purpose. Id. at 28-29.
71 Several studies since 1984 suggest that the funds could not handle a large scale
insolvency. INSURER FAILURES, supra note 11, at 33. Stewart Economics Inc., an
insurance consulting firm, noted in a recent study that the present state funds "were
not designed" for insolvencies of the size and complexity of general liability
insolvency. See McIntyre, supra note 11, at 18.
72 See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 11, which discussed the Stewart Economics
Inc. study which recommended a national guaranty fund which insurers could elect to
join. If an insurer joined, that insurer would no longer be part of the state system. See
also Hall, Solvency Monitoring Theme Gathers More Steam, BEST'S REVIEW, Jan.
1991, at 100 (Property/Casualty Insurance Edition); Hall, If Solvency Regulation is a




liquidation proceeding. The policyholder is a creditor to the extent of
unearned premiums paid by the policyholder and accrued losses. 73 In the
liquidation proceeding, the insured or claimant has priority to the assets
only after the liquidator pays administrative costs and debts to employees
in their entirety. 74 Thus, the insured or claimant may not recover anything
in the proceeding. Even if the insured or claimant recovers an amount, the
recovery occurs only after time-consuming marshaling and distribution of
assets.
III. CLAIMS AGAINST COLLATERAL PARTIES
A. Claims Against Brokers
Insureds of insolvent insurers have sought recovery from their brokers
when the insurer with whom the broker placed the insurance became
insolvent. 75 Insureds have based these suits primarily on claims of
negligence. All courts agree that a broker may not place insurance
negligently. If a broker fails to exercise care in the selection of the insurer
73 Most state statutes provide that any person recovering from the fund shall be
deemed to have assigned his rights under the policy to the fund to the extent of his
recovery against it. See, e.g, ALA. CODE § 27-42-11 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 38a-844(1) (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4211(a) (1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 175D, § 8(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30A-11(a) (1990). See
also GUARANTY MODEL ACT, supra note 54, § 11(a). The insured retains rights
above that amount. See generally 19A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 10724, at 194-
95, 216.
74 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. See also INSURING REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 5, § 45.05[51[fJ[iii], at 45-48 to 45-49.
75 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Milton Brokerage Assocs., 632 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa.
1986); Williams-Berryman Ins. Co. v. Morphis, 249 Ark. 786, 461 S.W.2d 577 (Ark.
1971); Wilson v. All Serv. Ins. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 793, 153 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Kane Ford Sales, Inc. v. Cruz, 119 Ill. App. 2d 102, 255 N.E.2d 90
(1970); Bordelon v. Herculeans Risks, Inc., 241 So. 2d 766 (La. Ct. App. 1970);
August v. British Int'l Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 194, 198 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank of Pierz v. Bosshart, 400 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1987); Ritchie v.
Smith, 311 So. 2d 642 (Miss. 1975); Gerald v. Universal Agency, Inc., 56 N.J.
Super. 362, 153 A.2d 359 (Super. N.J. 1959); Preston Ins. Agency v. May, 788
S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), writ granted, sub nom., May v. United Servs.
Ass'n, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 154 (Tex. 1990); Higginbotham & Assocs., Inc. v. Greer,
738 S.W.2d 45 ('rex. Ct. App. 1987); Sternoff Metals Corp. v. Vertecs Corp., 39
Wash. App. 333, 693 P.2d 175 (1984). See also Master Plumbers Ltd. Mutual Liab.
Co. v. Cormany & Bird, Inc., 79 Wis. 2d 308, 255 N.W.2d 533 (1977) (reinsurance
setting).
A breach of contract claim could be used regarding the purchase of the insurance
by the broker.
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and therefore places the insurance with an insolvent insurer, the insured
may recover. If the state has licensed the insurer, however, the courts have
not recognized a continuing duty on the part of the broker to monitor the
insurers with whom he or she has placed insurance. 76 As long as the
broker at the time of placement, after appropriate investigation, 77 had no
reason to know of a precarious financial condition of the insurer, the
broker has no liability for future insurer insolvency. The insured has no
recovery if the insurer is in apparently good financial health when the
broker places the insurance but later becomes insolvent. If the broker
places the insurance with an insurer not licensed to issue insurance in the
particular state, a surplus lines insurer, the broker must abide by all
statutory requirements or face potential liability if the surplus lines insurer
becomes insolvent. 78
Courts have found support for these broker negligence rules in the fact
that state regulators must monitor solvency status and protect the public.
The courts reason that brokers can rely on the state regulators. For
example, in Wilson v. All Service Insurance Corp.,79 a California appellate
court found that a broker had a duty to exercise care to avoid the placement
of insurance with an insolvent carrier. After outlining the regulatory
framework, the court stated:
76 See cases cited supra note 75. See also 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 25:48
(Rev. ed. 1984); 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 143 (1982). This standard allows a
claim that every renewal of insurance is a procurement. In the typical liability
insurance setting in which renewals occur rather frequently, a court's recognition of
renewal as a procurement would provide great protection for insureds because the
duty to place the insurance with a solvent insurer would be applicable.
77 In Higginbotham the court noted that the insurer was subject to state financial
regulation, paid claims promptly at the time of issuance, paid dividends to
policyholders, made an underwriting profit, and was rated B+ (very good) by the
Alfred M. Best rating service. A reasonable insurance broker would not have known
that the insurer was an unreasonable risk. The analysis implies that the reasonable
broker should investigate this sort of information. Higginbotham & Assocs., Inc. v.
Greer, 738 S.W.2d 45, 48. In Williams-Berryman Ins. Co. v. Morris, 249 Ark. 786,
788, 461 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ark. 1971), the court indicated that consulting Best's was
not necessary. See Bordelon v. Herculean Risks, Inc., 241 So. 2d 766, 769 (La. Ct.
App. 1970) (an example of insufficient investigation).
78 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Milton Brokerage Assocs., 632 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa.
1986); Farmers & Merchants State Bank of Pierz v. Bosshart, 400 N.W.2d 739
(Minn. 1987); Sternoff Metals Corp. v. Vertecs Corp., 39 Wash. App. 333, 693 P.2d
175 (1984). For example, in Goldstein, the court determined that a broker's failure to
abide by the surplus lines statute was negligence per se. Goldstein, 632 F. Supp. at
290.
79 91 Cal. App. 3d 793, 153 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979).
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The code imposes on the Insurance Commissioner the continuing duty to
oversee the financial condition of an insurer holding a certificate of
authority, and gives the Commissioner the power necessary to execute
such duty. It would be superfluous, and would create a conflict with the
regulatory scheme outlined in the Insurance Code, to impose upon an
insurance broker a similar duty to ascertain the financial soundness of an
insurer. 80
The theory that the state regulator protects the insureds and the public
from insurer insolvency explains the surplus lines statutes. A broker enjoys
protection if the state licenses an insurer to do business in the state because
the state then monitors and regulates the insurer.8 1 If, however, the state
does not license and therefore regulate an insurer, a broker placing
insurance with such an insurer has potential liability. This position assumes
that the present regulatory framework protects insureds and the public
adequately from insurer insolvency.
In Higginbotham & Associates, Inc. v. Greer,8 2 the court suggested an
expanded tort duty for the broker. In Higginbotham, the broker placed a
multi-peril policy on a bowling center with Proprietors Insurance
Corporation in 1980. After a fire destroyed the insured bowling center in
1981, the insolvency of Proprietors Insurance became evident.8 3 The
insured sought to hold the broker liable for negligence. The court stated:
[A]n agent is not liable for an insured's lost claim due to the insurer's
insolvency if the insurer is solvent at the time the policy is procured,
unless at that time or at a later time when the insured could be
protected, the agent knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should know, of facts or circumstances which would put a reasonable
agent on notice that the insurance presents an unreasonable risk.84
After applying the law to the facts, the Higginbotham court concluded:
'There is nothing in this testimony constituting evidence that a reasonable
agent would have known or should have known that PIC [Proprietors
Insurance Company] constituted an unreasonable risk at the time the
insurance was procured, or at any time prior to the loss. "85
80 Id. at 798; 153 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
81 See, e.g., Goldstein, 632 F. Supp. at 290; Farmers & Merchants State Bank of
Pierz, 400 N.W.2d at 744. See also Harrison, supra note 69, at 527 (argues that
brokers cannot be expected to be a better watchdog than the state).
82 738 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
83 Id. at 46.
84 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). See also Preston Ins. Agency v. May, 788 S.W.2d
608, 611 (Tex. Ct. App.), ivrit granted, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 154 (Tex. 1990) (quoting
the Higginbotham language in text). See generally Gottheimer, supra note 11, at 30.
g5 Higginbotham, 738 S.W.2d at 48 (emphasis added).
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Since the loss in Higginbotham occurred roughly one year after the
broker procured the insurance, the analysis of the broker's knowledge at
the time of procurement and at the time of loss is virtually identical. Thus,
the court may not have intended to suggest a broader duty for brokers.
B. Claims Against Excess Insurers
Insureds of insolvent insurers often have turned to the excess insurer
for compensation. 86 These actions have been actions on the contract of
86 See, e.g., Hudson Ins. Co. v. Gelman Sciences, Inc., 921 F.2d 92 (7th Cir.
1990); Lumar Marine, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 910 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir.
1990); Shapiro v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1990); Interco
Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 900 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1990); Sifers v. General Marine
Catering Co., 892 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990); Transco Exploration Co. v. Pacific
Employers Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1989); Harville v. Twin City Fire Ins.
Co., 885 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1989); Boudreaux v. Shannon Marine, Inc., 875 F.2d 511
(5th Cir. 1989); Steve D. Thompson Trucking, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 832
F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1987); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Heil Co., 815 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1987);
Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 792 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1986);
Continential Marble & Granite v. Canal Ins. Co., 785 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1986);
Molina v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 574 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1978); Ware v.
Carrom Health Care Prods., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Miss. 1989); New Process
Baking Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1991); Washington Ins. Guar.
Ass'n v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1160 (W.D. Wash. 1988); Highlands
Ins. Co. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 702 F. Supp. 109 (D. Md. 1988); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Tex. 1988); McGlynn v. Salen
Protexa Drilling Co., No. Civ. D. B-88-0266-CA (E.D. La. 1988) (1988 WL 70108);
Radiator Specialty Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 439 (W.D.N.C. 1987),
aff'd, 836 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1987); Holland v. Stanley Scrubbing Well Serv., 666 F.
Supp. 898 (W.D. La. 1987); Occidental Chem. 'Corp. v. Stolt-Nielsen, Inc., No. Civ.
D. 86-875 (E.D. La. 1987) (1987 WL 19050); Harrison v. General Marine Catering,
No. Civ. D. 86-1577 (E.D. La. 1986) (1986 WL 12689); McNeal v. First State Ins.
Co., No. Civ. D. 85-3927 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (1986 WL 4477), aff'd, 822 F.2d 53 (3d
Cir. 1987); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bayside Resort, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1456
(D.V.I. 1986); Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Kinder-Care, Inc., 551 So. 2d 286 (Ala.
1989); Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Magic City Trucking Serv., Inc., 547 So. 2d 849
(Ala. 1989); Alaska Rural Elec. Co-op Ass'n, Inc. v. INSCO, Ltd., 785 P.2d 1193
(Alaska 1990); Maricopa County v. Federal Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 308, 757 P.2d 112
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Span, Inc. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 3d 463,
277 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1991); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 640 P.2d
764, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1982); Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18
Cal. 2d 748, 117 P. 2d 669 (1941); Ross v. Canadian Indem. Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App.
3d 396, 191 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1983); Fontenot v. Haight, 764 P.2d 378 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988); Golden Isles Hosp., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 327 So. 2d 789 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,
257 Ga. 77, 355 S.E.2d 428 (1987); Lamb Bros. Lumber Co. v. South Carolina Ins.
Co., 186 Ga. App. 51, 366 S.E.2d 388 (1988); Donald B. MacNeal, Inc. v. Interstate
[Vol. 52:10751096
TORTREMEDY FOR INSUREDS
Fire & Casualty Co., 132 Ill. App. 3d 564, 477 N.E.2d 1322 (1985); Kelly v. Weil,
563 So. 2d 221 (La. 1990); Ursin v. Insurance Guar. Ass'n, 412 So. 2d 1285 (La.
1981); Weaver v. Kitchens, 570 So. 2d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1990), writ denied, 573 So.
2d 1123 (La. 1991); MeWright v. Modern Iron Works, Inc., 567 So. 2d 707 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 571 So. 2d 651 (La. 1990); Gibson v. Kreihs, 538 So. 2d 1057
(La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 541 So. 2d 856 (La. 1989); Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n
v. International Ins. Co., 551 So. 2d 50 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Robichaux v. Randolph,
555 So. 2d 581 (La. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 556 So. 2d 1288 (La.), cert. denied,
559 So. 2d 127 (La.), aff'd, 563 So. 2d 226 (La. 1990); McGuire v. Davis Truck
Serv., 518 So. 2d 1171 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 526 So. 2d 791 (1988); Nasello
v. Transit Casualty Co., 530 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1988); Radar v. Duke Transp., Inc.,
492 So. 2d 532 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Beauregard v. Salmon, 211 So. 2d 732 (La. Ct
App.), cert. denied, 252 La. 882, 214 So. 2d 550 (1968); Massachusetts Insurers
Insolvency Fund v. Continental Casualty Co., 399 Mass. 598, 506 N.E.2d 118 (1987);
Gulezian v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 399 Mass. 606, 506 N.E.2d 123 (1987); Northmeadow
Tennis Club, Inc. v. Northeastern Fire Ins. Co., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 526 N.E.2d
1333, review denied, 403 Mass. 1103, 529 N.E.2d 1345 (1988); Morbark Indus., Inc.
v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 170 Mich. App. 603, 429 N.W.2d 213 (1988), appeal
denied, 432 Mich. 896 (1989); American Hoist & Derrick v. Employers' of Wausau,
454 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, (1990); Seaway Port Auth. of
Duluth v. Midland Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 754 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Central Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 231 Neb. 640, 437 N.W.2d 496 (1989); Werner Indus.,
Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 112 N.J. 30, 548 A.2d 188 (1988); Steyr-Daimler-Puch
A.G. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 A.D.2d 942, 543 N.Y.S.2d 538, appeal denied, 74
N.Y.2d 617, 550 N.Y.S.2d 277, 549 N.E.2d 479 (1989); Ambassador Assocs. v.
Corcoran, 143 Misc. 2d 706, 541 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. 1989), aff'd, 168 A.D.2d 281,
562 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1990); American Reins. Co. v. SGB Universal Builders Supply
Inc., 141 Misc. 2d 375, 532 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); Gladstone v. D.W.
Ritter Co., 133 Misc. 2d 922, 508 N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. Sup. 1986); Prince Carpentry,
Inc. v. Cosmopolitan Mutual Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 2d 919, 479 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct.
1984); St. Vincent's Hosp. & Medical Center v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 117
Misc. 2d 665, 457 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Zurich-American Ins. Co. v.
Mead Reins. Corp., 161 A.D.2d 403, 555 N.Y.S.2d 333, appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d
710, 563 N.Y.S.2d 61, 564 N.E.2d 671 (1990); Pergament Distrib., Inc. v. Old
Republic Ins. Co., 128 A.D.2d 760, 513 N.Y.S.2d 467, appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d
607, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1031, 514 N.E.2d 389 (1987); Pergament Distrib., Inc. v. Twin
City Fire Ins. Co., 128 A.D.2d 759, 513 N.Y.S.2d 650, appeal denied, 519 N.Y.S.2d
1031, 514 N.E.2d 389 (1987); Newton v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 98 N.C. App.
619, 391 S.E.2d 837, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 637, 399 S.E.2d 329 (1990); Wurth v.
Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 3d 325, 518 N.E.2d 607 (1987); Value City, Inc.
v. Integrity Ins. Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d 274, 508 N.E.2d 184 (1986); Luko v. Lloyd's
of London, 393 Pa. Super. 165, 573 A.2d 1139, appeal denied, Petition of Lloyd's of
London, 526 Pa. 636, 584 A.2d 319 (1990), Luko v. Lloyd's of London, 526 Pa. 637,
584 A.2d 319 (1990); Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Long, 387 Pa. Super. 574, 564 A.2d
937 (1989), appeal granted, 582 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1990); Rapid City Regional Hosp.,
Inc. v. South Dakota Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 436 N.W.2d 565 (S.D. 1989); Federal Ins. Co.
v. Pacific Sheet Metal, Inc., 54 Wash. App. 514, 774 P.2d 538, review denied, 113
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excess insurance. If the insured recognizes or fears that insurance provided
by its primary insurer does not protect it sufficiently against the possible
high verdicts available to plaintiffs on a variety of liability bases, the
insured may obtain excess insurance. The insured purchases additional
insurance to cover the same loss covered by the primary insurer as part of
a comprehensive plan of risk management.8 7 True excess insurance
provides coverage only when, and to the extent that, the loss exceeds a
certain amount or exceeds the contemplated coverage provided by primary
insurance. 88
The excess insurer contracts directly with the insured. The contract
may state that it provides a certain amount of indemnity coverage for a loss
only to the extent that the loss exceeds a specific dollar amount. 89 In the
alternative, the contract may not list a specific dollar amount but may
simply provide that the insurer will pay the "ultimate net loss in excess of
the retained limit" which is defined as "the total of the applicable limits of
the underlying policies listed . . ., and the applicable limits of any other
Wash. 2d 1008, 779 P.2d 727 (1989); Lechner v. Scharrer, 145 Wis. 2d 667, 429
N.W.2d 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
87 See 8A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 4909.85, at 452; Marick, Excess
Insurance: An Overview of General Principles and Current Issues, 24 TORT & INS.
L.J. 715, 715 (1989). Verdicts that exceed primary coverage are a recent
phenomenon. Griffin, Excess Liability Insurance, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 375, 376 (1979).
88 Primary coverage is that "whereby, under the terms of the policy, liability
attaches immediately upon the happening of the occurrence that gives rise to liability."
Excess coverage is that "whereby, under the terms of the policy, liability attaches only
after a predetermined amount of primary coverage has been exhausted." Whitehead v.
Fleet Towing Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 442 N.E.2d 1362, 1366 (1982). See
also Olympic Ins. Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 593,
597-98, 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 910 (1982). See also P. MAGARICK, EXCESS LIABILITY
INSURANCE: THE LAW OF EXTRA CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF INSURERS § 17.01,
at 17-2 (3d ed. 1989); B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 6.03(a), at 164-65 (3d ed. 1990). See generally Marick, supra
note 87, at 717.
89 See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Employers' of Wausau, 454
N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). In American Hoist the policy in question stated:
"The company shall indemnify the insured for loss sustained by the insured in excess
of the underlying insurance in accordance with the insurance agreements, exclusions
and other terms and conditions of the immediate underlying policy." "Underlying
insurance"was defined as "$15 MILLION."The limit of liability was "$10 MILLION
EACH OCCURRENCE AND AGGREGATE (WHERE APPLICABLE) IN EXCESS
OF THE UNDERLYING INSURANCE STATED. . . ." Id. at 465. See also Interco
Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 900 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1990) ("the Company shall
be liable only for the limit of liability stated in Item 3 of the Declarations (Item 3: $40
million) in excess of the limit or limits of liability of the applicable underlying




insurance collectible by the insured .. "90 The policy may use other
language, such that it provides coverage "in excess of the amount
recoverable under the underlying insurance."91 All of these variations of
contract language may provide true excess insurance. 92
True excess insurance contrasts with a type of primary insurance
containing, in effect, an "other insurance" clause which uses excess
insurance language. Such a policy states that it provides coverage in excess
of any other insurance but that if no other insurance exists, the policy
provides primary coverage. 93 Insurers use this type of excess insurance
90 Newton v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 98 N.C. App. 619, 623, 391 S.E.2d 837, 839
(1990) (covering "the ultimate net loss in excess of the retained limit" with "retained
limit" defined in part as "the total of the applicable limits of the underlying policies
listed in Schedule A hereof, and the applicable limits of any other insurance collectible
by the insured"), reh'g denied, 327 N.C. 637, 399 S.E.2d 329 (1990). See also State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. LiMauro, 65 N.Y.2d 369, 375, 482 N.E.2d 13, 19, 492
N.Y.S.2d 534, 540 (N.Y. 1985) (covering risks "in excess of the retained limit" which
was defined as "the total limit(s) of liability of any underlying insurance collectible" by
the Insured).
91 Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 112 N.J. 30, 34-35, 548 A.2d 188,
190 (1988) (emphasis added by the court). Many courts dealing with this language
have indicated that in some circumstances the coverage provided is primary. See, e.g.,
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 640 P.2d 764, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628
(1982); Donald B. MacNeal, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 132 Ill. App. 3d
564, 477 N.E.2d 1322 (1985); McGuire v. Davis Truck Serv., Inc., 518 So. 2d 1171
(La. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 526 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1988).
92 Excess insurance may provide its own exclusions and conditions with regard to
general coverage or it may adopt by reference the exclusions and conditions of the
underlying insurance. See Marick, supra note 87, at 718. Umbrella insurance contains
an excess insurance component but may also contain a primary insurance component
in that it may cover losses not covered by the underlying primary policy-of insurance.
For example, an umbrella policy may provide "personal injury" protection that
includes coverage for libel, slander and malicious prosecution while the primary
policy excludes these bases of liability. See 8A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19,
§ 4909.85, at 452; R. KEETON & A. WIDIss, supra note 2, § 3.11(a)(3), at 257. See
also Garmany v. Mission Ins. Co., 785 F.2d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 1986); Continental
Casualty v. Roper Corp., 173 Ill. App. 3d 760, 761-62, 527 N.E.2d 998, 1001-03
(1988); Bryan Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 60 N.J. 375, 290
A.2d 138 (1972).
93 See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 3.11(a)(1), at 253-55; Marick,
supra note 87, at 717-18; A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES:
REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 7.01-03 (2d ed.
1988).
The excess insurance clause in Western States Mutual Ins. Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 694, 272 N.E.2d 439 (1971), stated in pertinent part:
If there is other valid and collectible insurance, whether primary, excess or
contingent, available to the garage customer and the limits of such insurance are
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clause to deter overinsuring for the purpose of double recovery. 94 The
clauses create a situation whereby an insured may pay premiums for two
primary coverages but can recover from only one unless the loss exceeds
the first policy. The insured holding a policy with such a clause will be
deterred, if he knows of the clause, from purchasing other insurance
because he obtains very little in protection with his second premium
payment. 95
An insured suffering a loss covered by a policy with an insolvent
primary insurer may attempt to recover any loss not compensated by a
insufficient to pay damages up to the amount of the applicable fimancial
responsibility limit, then this insurance shall apply to the excess of damages up to
such limit.
Id. at 696, 272 N.E.2d at 440. See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. LiMauro,
65 N.Y.2d 369, 376, 482 N.E.2d 13, 19, 492 N.Y.S.2d 534 (N.Y. 1985).
94 In the property insurance context, the presence of two or more insurance
policies covering property may provide incentive for that property to meet an end not
entirely fortuitous. R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 3.11(a)(2), at 255-56.
95 For a general discussion of other insurance clauses, see Kurtock, Overlapping
Liability Coverage-7The "Other Insurance" Provision, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 45
(1974); Note, Conflicts Between "Other Insurance" Clauses in Automobile Liability
Insurance Policies, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1292 (1969); Note, Concurrent Coverage in
Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (1965); Note, Automobile
Liability Insurance- Effect of Double Coverage and "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38
MINN. L. REv. 838 (1954).
Premiums for true excess insurance have been low historically compared to
primary premiums for the same dollar amount of coverage because premiums for
excess policies reflect the lower risk that a covered loss will exceed the limits of the
primary insurance or the floor of the excess coverage. See 8A J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 19, § 4909.85, at 452. The low premiums also reflect the anticipated minimal
involvement in the claims handling and defense by the excess insurer. Marick, supra
note 87, at 715. The Alaska Supreme Court in Alaska Rural Electric Coop. Assoc. v.
INSCO Ltd., 785 P.2d 1193, 1194 (1990), noted that excess insurance policies have
low premiums because of the limited liability.
Unlike primary insurance with an excess insurance clause, the true excess insurer
does not accept premiums for primary coverage but then attempt to escape
responsibility. The true excess insurer accepts a premium reflecting the actual risk
assumed, not a risk of primary coverage. See 8A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19,
§ 4909.85, at 453-55. Cases have held that policies with excess clauses must pay
losses before true excess insurance applies. See, e.g., Carriers Ins. Co. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 512 F.2d 360, 364 (10th Cir. 1975); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. LiMauro, 65 N.Y.2d 369, 482 N.E.2d 13, 492 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1985).
In State Farm, the court noted that in addition to the contract language, the amount of
the premiums was indicative of the type of insurance purchased. The true excess
policy premium was $144 for $1,000,000 of coverage. The excess insurance clause
policy premium was $119 for $100,000/$300,000 automobile liability coverage. Id. at
540, 482 N.E.2d at 20, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
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Thus, if courts find that the insurance in question is true excess
insurance, the courts do not require the excess insurer to "drop down" and
provide coverage. If the courts find that by the language of the contract,
the insurer agreed to provide primary coverage in certain instances and
insolvency is one of those instances, the courts find that the excess insurer
must pay the insured when the initial insurer becomes insolvent. The courts
have not dealt with claims of tort duty of the excess insurer in the
insolvency setting.
C. Claims Against Reinsurers
The insured of an insolvent insurer may pursue the reinsurer of the
insolvent insurer if one exists. Courts treat these actions as actions on the
contract of reinsurance.1°9 The reinsurer enters into an arrangement with
the original insurer, who later becomes insolvent, to assume part of the
risk assumed by the insurer in contracts with the original insureds.110 In
effect, the reinsurer insures insurers. Reinsurance takes two basic forms. In
treaty reinsurance, the original insurer cedes all or a part of a particular
class of risk to the reinsurer in exchange for a portion of the premiums
paid relating to those risks. No separate agreement exists as to specific
policies. 111 Facultative reinsurance covers only a single risk or policy
The problem with focusing on the premiums is that the excess insurer may have
intended to insure in the event of primary insolvency. The excess premium is smaller
than the primary premium because the risk that the primary will become insolvent is
conceived to be small. Perhaps the courts' reliance on the premiums paid reflects the
courts' belief that the excess insurer did not foresee the possibility of primary insurer
insolvency.
109 See, e.g., Leff v. NAC Agency, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1426, 1427 (E.D. Mich.
1986); Arrow Trucking Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 691 (La. 1985);
Ainsworth v. General Reins. Corp., 751 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1985).
110 See CAL. INS. CODE § 620 (Deering 1991), which states: "A contract of
reinsurance is one be which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against
loss or liability by reason of such original insurance." Fontenot v. Marquette Casualty
Co., 258 La. 671, 682, 247 So. 2d 572, 575-76 (La. 1971), notes the following
purposes of reinsurance: 1) Increase the ceding company's capacity; 2) stabilize the
ceding company's operating results; 3) allow the ceding company to attain greater
spread of risk; 4) allow the ceding company to withdraw quickly from a particular line
of business; 5) allow the ceding company to reduce reserves; 6) allow the ceding
company to spread risk of catastrophe. See also Nutter, Insurer Insolvencies, Guaranty
Funds, and Reinsurance Proceeds, 29 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 373, 373-74 (Summer
1979); 13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7681, at 480; 19 COUCH ON INSURANCE,
supra note 77, § 80:2, at 624-25.
III See 13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7681, at 481; 19 COUCH ON
INSURANCE, supra note 76, § 80:3, at 626. See also Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co. v.
Castle Reins. Co., 665 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir. 1981); Fontenot v. Marquette Casualty
Co., 258 La. 671, 247 So. 2d 572 (1971). The treaty may apply to future contracts.
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written by the original insured. For example, an insurer may enter into a
policy to provide liability coverage of 1 million dollars and then acquire
reinsurance to cover 800,000 dollars of that amount. 112 With either type of
reinsurance contract, the original insured is not a party to the contract, has
no contact with the reinsurer and may not even know of the reinsurer's
existence.113 Reinsurance reduces the exposure of the primary insurer to
liability on specific.risks and allows a greater spread of risk. In addition, it
permits a reduction of reserves by the ceding company.114
Most, if not all reinsurance contracts contain an insolvency clause
which provides that upon the insolvency of the original insurer, the
reinsurer must pay the liquidator on the basis of the liability of the original
insurer, the ceding company, not on the basis of the amount paid by that
company.1 15 Insurers first developed the clause to overcome the holding of
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Pink,116 a United States Supreme
112 13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7681, at 481; 19 COUCH ON
INSURANCE, supra note 76, § 80:3, at 626. See also INSURING REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 5, § 46.03[21, at 46-7 to 46-9. See also Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co.
U.S. Branch v. Cologne Reins. Co. of Am., 75 N.Y.2d 295, 552 N.E.2d 139, 552
N.Y.S.2d 891 (1990); Arrow Trucking Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 691,
692 (La. 1985) (Reserve Ins. Co. issued excess insurance covering liability for losses
between $100,000 and $2.1 million and then reinsured $1.8 million of that).
113 13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7681, at 480. The original insurer
handles all matters relating to the loss of the original insured. Id. See also 19 COUCH
ON INSURANCE, supra note 76, § 80:1, at 624. Nontypical reinsurance contracts
contain "cut through" endorsements which create rights in favor of the original
insured. 19 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 76, § 80:70, at 679; Semple & Hall,
The Reinsurer's Liability in the Event of the Insolvency of a Ceding Property and
Casualty Insurer, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 407, 411 (1986).
114 Nutter, supra note 110, at 374; Semple & Hall, supra note 113, at 415.
115 See Semple & Hall, supra note 113, at 409-410. A typical insolvency clause
states:
In the event of the insolvency of the Company, reinsurance under this Certificate
shall be payable by the reinsurer on the basis of the liability of the Company
without diminution because of insolvency, directly to the Company or its
liquidator, receiver, or statutory successor, except as otherwise provided by law.
Semple & Hall, supra note 113, at 410 n.11. See Arrow Trucking Co. v. Continental
Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 691, 699 (La. 1985); Ainsworth v. General Reins. Corp., 751
F.2d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 1985).
116 302 U.S. 224 (1937), reh'g denied, 302 U.S. 780 (1938). In Pink the New
York Superintendent of Insurance, acting as liquidator, requested payment from the
reinsurer. The insurance contract required the reinsurer to pay only "against loss,"
which the reinsurer argued was payment by the insolvent insurer, not liability. The
court agreed. See Skandia Am. Reins. Corp. v. Schenck, 441 F. Supp. 715, 725
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (discussing the Pink case).
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guaranty fund from a true excess insurer or from an insurer whose contract
contains an excess "other insurance" clause. Typically, the insured argues
that (1) the contract language requires the insurer to "drop down" and
provide primary coverage for the otherwise covered loss, and that (2) even
if the contract language does not provide coverage, the reasonable
expectations of the insured does. 96
The contract interpretation position argues, in effect, that the supposed
excess policy provides primary insurance. Courts have decided this issue
by carefully analyzing the language of the contracts and by applying
traditional contract interpretation principles. 97 When courts face an
insurance contract that states a specific dollar floor for coverage, they have
determined generally that the insurance provided does not "drop down."98
This is a finding that the supposed excess policy provided is true excess
insurance. When courts have interpreted contracts which provide insurance
above a retained limit defined as the insurance listed in the contract and
"the applicable limits of any other insurance collectible by the insured," 99
many have found that the insurance contract does not provide indemnity for
the covered loss in the event of insolvency of the primary insurer. 10
96 See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Employers' of Wausau, 454
N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Alaska Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. INSCO, Ltd.,
785 P.2d 1193 (Alaska 1990). The reported opinions do not deal with tort claims. For
a general discussion of reasonable expectations, see R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra
note 2, §§ 6.1, 6.3; Giesel, The Knowledge of Insurers and the Posture of the Parties
in the Determination of the Insurability of Punitive Damages, 39 U. KAN. L. REV.
355, 406 (1991).
97 See, e.g., Interco Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 900 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1990);
Transco Exploration Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 862, 864-65 (5th
Cir. 1989); Ware v. Carrom Health Care Prods., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 300, 304-05
(N.D. Miss. 1989). For a discussion of the various interpretations given to certain
contract Ifnguage, see Note, Insolvency in the Insurance Industry and 'Drop Down"
Coverage: A Realistic Solution, 8 J.L. & CoM. 423 (1988); Brady & Grogan, The
Excess Drop Down Issue: When is the Excess Carrier Responsible for the Insolvency of
a Primary Carrier? 39 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 63 (1988); Goldstein, Recent Insurance
Cases: Umbrella Policies and Insolvent Primary Insurers, FOR DEF., Aug. 1988, at 3.
98 See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Employers' of Wausau, 454
N.W.2d 462, 467 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Alaska Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. INSCO,
Ltd., 785 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Alaska 1990); Luko v. Lloyd's of London, 393 Pa.
Super. 165, 171-73, 573 A.2d 1139, 1142-43 (1990).
99 Newton v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 98 N.C. App. 619, 623, 391 S.E.2d
837, 839 (1990).
100 See Id. at 624-25, 391 S.E.2d at 839-40 (no drop down); Kelly v. Weil, 563
So. 2d 221 (La. 1990) (no drop down); Federal Ins. Co. v. Pacific Sheet Metal, Inc.,
54 Wash. App. 514, 774 P.2d 538 (1989) (no drop down). Compare Alabama Ins.
Guar. Ass'n v. Magic City Trucking Serv., Inc., 547 So. 2d 849, 853-56 (Ala. 1989)
(drop down required).
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Some courts, in evaluating contracts providing coverage for losses "in
excess of the amount recoverable under underlying insurance," 101 find no
amount of underlying insurance recoverable and thus the insurer must
"drop down"to provide primary coverage.' 0 2 Other courts dealing with this
language find that the "amount recoverable" language refers to the amount
that would have been recoverable had the primary insurer not become
insolvent.103 The insurance provided is true excess insurance.
Occasionally, courts evaluating contract language focus on the amount of
premiums paid to clarify the intent of the parties regarding the contract.1 4
Courts entertaining the reasonable expectations argument have found it
unpersuasive.105 In American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Employers' of
Wausau,10 6 the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the contract
unambiguously provided true excess coverage because the policy provided
coverage "in excess of the the underlying insurance" and the "underlying
insurance" was defined as "$15 million."107 The court found that given the
fact that the insured, a sophisicated business with experienced insurance
employees, paid much less for the excess policy than for the underlying
policies, it was not reasonable for the insured to expect that the excess
policy covered not only the risk assumed by the underlying policies but
also the risk above the primary policy. 10 8
101 Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 112 N.J. 30, 34-35, 548 A.2d
188, 190 (1988).
102 See, e.g., Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 640 P.2d 764, 180
Cal. Rptr. 628 (1982); Donald B. MacNeal, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.,
132 Ill. App. 3d 564, 477 N.E.2d 1322 (1985); McGuire v. Davis Trucking Serv.,
518 So. 2d 1171 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Lechner v. Scharrer, 145 Wis. 2d 667, 429
N.W.2d 491 (1988).
103 See, e.g., Rapid City Regional Hosp., Inc. v. South Dakota Ins. Guar. Ass'n,
436 N.W.2d 565 (S.D. 1989); Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 112 N.J.
30, 548 A.2d 188 (1988).
104 See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Employers' of Wausau, 454
N.W..2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Alaska Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. INSCO, Ltd.,
785 P.2d 1193 (Alaska 1990). The courts in both of these cases look to the relative
amounts of the premiums paid to determine the reasonableness of the insureds'
expectations. American Hoist, 454 N.W.2d at 467; Alaska Rural, 785 P.2d at 1194-95.
105 See, e.g., American Hoist, 454 N.W.2d 462; Alaska Rural, 785 P.2d 1193.
106 454 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
107 Id. at 465-67.
108 The insured paid $50,000 and $42,500 for two policies with insurers who
became insolvent. In contrast, the insured paid only $20,000 for the excess policy at
issue. Id. at 467. In Alaska Rural, the court noted that the primary insurance premium
was $150,000 while the putative excess insurer accepted a premium of $43,992. Thus,
the court concluded that it was unreasonable to expect the excess insurer to provide
coverage in place of the primary insurer. Alaska Rural, 785 P.2d at 1194.
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Court case which overturried prior law by holding that the reinsurer need
not pay an otherwise covered claim unless and until the ceding company
paid the claim. 117 The Pink rule created a windfall for reinsurers in the
insolvency setting because insolvent ceding companies rarely, if ever, had
the ability to pay the claim. Thus, reinsurers rarely would pay the
reinsurance proceeds in an insolvency situation.118 In response to Pink,
many states developed statutes requiring that reinsurance agreements
contain insolvency clauses if the ceding insurer desired credit for the
reinsurance so it could reduce the mandatory reserves held. 119 Because
reduced mandatory reserves is one of the primary attributes of obtaining
117 Prior to Pink the reinsurer had to indemnify the liquidator when the insolvent
insurer became liable, regardless of contract language. See Allemannia Fire Ins. Co.
v. Fireman's Ins. Co. ex rel. Wolfe, 209 U.S. 326 (1908).
118 See generally Comment, Reinsurance and Insurer Insolvency: The Problem of
Direct Recovery by the Original Insured or Injured Claimant, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
872, 878-81 (1982).
119 LA. REV. STAT. § 22:941(B)(2) (1990) provides:
B. The ceding insurer may take credit for the reserves on such ceded risks to the
extent reinsured, except that:...
(2)(a) No credit shall be allowed to any ceding insurer for reinsurance, as an
admitted asset or as a deduction from liability, unless the reinsurance shall be
payable, in the event of insolvency of the ceding insurer, to its liquidator or
receiver on the basis of the claim or claims allowed against the insolvent ceding
insurer by any court of competent jurisdiction or any justice or judge thereof, or
by any receiver or liquidator having authority to determine and allow such claims,
except either where the reinsurance contract with the consent of the direct insured
or insureds specifically provides another payee of such reinsurance in the event of
the insolvency of the ceding insurer or when the assuming insurer with the
consent of the direct insured or insureds has assumed such policy obligations of
the ceding insurer as direct obligations of the assuming insurer to the payees
under such policies and in substitution for the obligations of the ceding insurer to
such payees.
For other examples of such statutes, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.12.020
(1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-261 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-62-204 (1987);
CAL. INS. CODE § 922.2 (Deering 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 785.2, § 173.2
(1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 731B(5) (1989); MD. CODE ANN. § 74
(1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 20 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.246
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-417 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-7- 11 (1978);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1308 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-7-30 (1990); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 731.508 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-2-207, -13-122 (1990); TEXAS INS.
CODE ANN. art. 5.75-1 (1991); VA. CODE § 38.2-131.65 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.12.160 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 33-4-15 (1966).
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reinsurance, 120 a statute of this nature virtually mandates universal
insolvency clauses.
Unfortunately for the insured, the typical insolvency clause has the
added effect of requiring the reinsurer to pay the proceeds due in an
insolvency situation to the "liquidator, receiver or statutory successor" of
the insolvent insurer. 121 Several cases have relied upon the clause to deny
causes of action of insureds attempting to recover directly from
reinsurers. 122 Various guaranty funds have argued that they are the
"statutory successor(s)" of the insolvent insurer such that they should be
able to recover directly from the reinsurer. However, the courts have held
that the liquidator receives the reinsurance proceeds absent specific
language to the contrary. 123
American Reinsurance Co. v. Insurance Commission of California124
presents the typical treatment by the courts regarding the insolvency
clause. In American, the court noted that the applicable insolvency clause
statute stated that reinsurance proceeds must be paid to the "conservator,
liquidator or statutory successor" unless the reinsurance contract provides
specifically to the contrary.12 5 The court then concluded that the California
Insurance Commissioner was the designated liquidator and that therefore
the reinsurance proceeds must be paid to the Commissioner. 12 6
120 See Semple & Hall, supra note 113, at 415; Nutter, supra note 110, at 374;
B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, supra note 88, § 14.08(a), at 453-56. See also
American Re-Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'n of Cal., 527 F. Supp. 444, 452 (C.D.
Cal. 1981).
121 See insolvency clause contained supra note 115.
122 See, e.g., Ainsworth v. General Reins. Corp., 751 F.2d 962, 965-66 (8th Cir.
1985); American Reins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'n of Cal., 527 F. Supp. 444, 453-56
(C.D. Cal. 1981); Fontenot v. Marquette Casualty Co., 258 La. 671, 247 So. 2d 572,
580-82 (1971). See also Estate of Osborn v. Gerling Global Life Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d
169, 172 (Miss. 1988) (health insurance context).
123 See, e.g., General Reins. Co. v. Missouri General Ins. Co., 596 F.2d 330,
332 (8th Cir. 1979); Skandia America Reins. Corp. v. Barnes, 458 F. Supp. 13, 15
(D. Colo. 1978). Cf First Nat'l Bank v. Higgins, 357 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1962). A few
reinsurance contracts contain "cut through" endorsements or other similar clauses that
specifically redirect reinsurance proceeds to the insured rather than to the liquidator.
See supra note 113. If contract language is honored, such clauses should make
recovery by an insured certain. Yet, these endorsements are the exception, not the
rule, and may not be enforced by courts. See Semple & Hall, supra note 113, at 411,
n.14 (discussing Warranty Ass'n v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., No. R-80-334 (April 13,
1983 P.R.) in which the court stated that the cut through endorsements were improper
preferences)). See, e.g., Ascherman v. General Reins. Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 307,
311, 228 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1986).
124 527 F. Supp. 444 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
125 Id. at 452.
12 6 Id. at 453.
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Courts also deny causes of action of insureds against reinsurers because
no privity of contract exists. The reinsurer does not owe the insured
because the reinsurer has no contract with the insured. 127 For example, in
Ainsworth v. General Reinsurance Corp.,128 the court, when dealing with a
claim for reinsurance proceeds, stated: "An ordinary contract of
reinsurance, in the absence of provisions to the contrary, operates solely as
between the reinsurer and the reinsured. It creates no privity between the
original insured and the reinsurer."129
Insureds have attempted unsuccessfully to recover on the theory that
the insured is the third-party beneficiary of the reinsurance contract. 130 In
127 See, e.g., Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405 (1929); Credit
Managers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1987);
Ainsworth v. General Reins. Corp., 751 F.2d 962, 964-65 (8th Cir. 1985); Citizens
Casualty Co. v. American Glass Co., 166 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1948); Taggart v. Keim,
103 F.2d 194, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1939); United States v. Federal Sur. Co., 72 F.2d 964
(4th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crist,
731 F. Supp. 928, 930 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Employers Reins. Corp. v. American
Fidelity & Casualty, 196 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1959); American Cast Iron v.
Statesman Ins. Co., 343 F. Supp. 860, 865 (D. Minn. 1972); McDonough Constr. v.
Pan Am. Sur., 190 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Baylor v. Highway Ins. Co., 57
Ill. 2d 590, 316 N.E.2d 633 (1974); Reid v. Ruffin, 503 Pa. 458, 463, 469 A.2d
1030, 1033-34 (1983); Eastern Eng'g & Elevator Co. v. American Reins. Co., 309
Pa. Super. 578, 580-82, 455 A.2d 1235, 1236 (1983); Schuylkill Prods. Inc. v. H.
Rupert & Sons, 305 Pa. Super. 36, 40, 451 A.2d 229, 231 (1982); McFarling v.
Mayfield, 510 S.W.2d 108, 109 (rex. Ct. App. 1974). See generally 19 COUCH ON
INSURANCE, supra note 76, § 80:69; 13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 7694, at
527-32.
128 751 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1985).
129 Id. at 965 (quoting O'Hare v. Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Mo. 1959)).
130 For cases dealing with the third-party beneficiary theory, see Ainsworth v.
General Reins. Corp., 751 F.2d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 1985); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Crist, 731 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Leffv. NAC Agency, Inc., 639 F.
Supp. 1426, 1429 (E.D. Mich. 1986); American Cast Iron v. Statesman Ins. Co., 343
F. Supp. 860, 864-65 (D. Minn. 1972); Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co.,
211 F. Supp. 227 (M.D.N.C. 1962), aft'd, 316 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1963); Melco Sys.
v. Receiver of Trans-Am., 268 Ala. 152, 105 So. 2d 43 (1958); Clark & Co. v.
Department of Ins., 436 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983); Arrow Trucking Co. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 691, 700-01 (La. 1985). For a general discussion of
third-party beneficiary theory, see I. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACrs 605
(1977).
Insureds have attempted to recover in related settings on the theory that the
primary insurer acts as the agent of the reinsurer. In Reid v. Ruffin, 503 Pa. 458, 469
A.2d 1030 (1983), the insured pursued a claim against the reinsurer on the theory that
the original insurer, which was insolvent, had acted as the agent of the reinsurer when
that original insurer committed acts of bad faith. Id. at 461, 469 A.2d at 1032. The
court stated that although the reinsurer had reserved the power to consent to all
settlements, it had no power over the original insurer with regard to decisions to
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Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crist,131 insureds claimed that they
were third-party beneficiaries of the reinsurance contract. The court stated
that the reinsurance contract must clearly state that the contracting parties
intended the third party to benefit from the contract performance and that
the presumption was to the contrary.132
As a result of these holdings, the reinsurer pays the liquidator of the
insolvent insured who then disburses all sums according to the general
distribution order. The insureds receive proceeds via guaranty fund
payment or individually in the liquidation proceeding after administrative
costs and debts to employees are paid.
IV. JUSTIFICATION OF TORT DUTY FOR COLLATERAL PARTIES
A. Recognition of Tort Duty
The law of torts allocates losses arising from human activities. 133
Courts have considered various factors in the placement of loss including
the interest of the plaintiff, the interest of the defendant, the interest of the
public, and "social engineering" goals. 134 The relative ability of the
respective parties to bear the loss by absorption, avoidance, or distribution
acts as an important factor in the tort recognition calculus. 135 Also, the
financial benefit gained by a party may support a recognition of a tort duty
owed by that party. 136 Courts often recognize new tort duties. 137 Because
refuse to settle. Id. at 462-63, 469 A.2d at 1033. For examples of agency cases, see
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972); Reid v. Ruffin,
503 Pa. 458, 469 A.2d 1030 (Pa. 1983). The agency theory may be more successful
now that "fronting"is recognized. Fronting is the process by which an insurer licensed
to operate within a state issues insurance and then, often in accord with a prearranged
plan, cedes most or all of the risk to an unlicensed reinsurer. This is really only
circumvention of the licensing requirements. See Failed Pronses, supra note 11;
Gastel, supra note 6.
131 731 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
132 Id. at 931. Some courts have found a third-party beneficiary. See, e.g.,
Homan v. Employers Reins. Corp., 345 Mo. 650, 136 S.W.2d 289 (1939); O'Hare v.
Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1959); First Nat'l Bank v. Higgins, 357 S.W.2d 139
(Mo. 1962).
133 W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 1, at 6.
134 W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 3, at 16.
135 Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805 (1930) and 79 U. PA. L. REv. 742 (1931);
Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952).
136 McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949).
See also W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 56, at 374.
137 Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CAL. L.
REV. 461 (1922). Recent torts include wrongful birth and prenatal injury. W.
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insolvencies are common, insureds and the public as a whole receive
inadequate protection. The solution to the problematic plight of insureds
may be judicial recognition of a tort duty on the part of collateral parties to
monitor the solvency of primary insurers.
B. The Insured Should Not Bear the Loss
One facet of the justification of placing the tort duty on the collateral
parties is the conclusion that the risk of loss in the insolvency setting
should not rest with the insured or the claimant. An important goal of state
insurance regulators, in the past and to date, has been protection of
insureds and the public 138- specifically, protection from insurer
insolvency. 139
The typical insured or claimant needs complete protection. In a
traditional contract relationship, each party to the contract bears the risk
that the other party cannot perform for whatever reason, including
insolvency. The law assumes that each party can choose its contract
partner, can investigate the financial condition of those with whom it
contracts, and can structure the deal to protect itself against the insolvency
of the contracting partner. 140 If this rule applied to insurance contracts, one
would expect the insured to bear the loss and accept the remedies any other
creditor of any insolvent company might have. 141
Several characteristics of the insurance relationship make such a rule
unfair. The insured cannot protect itself by contrac. Rarely in the
insurance context are the insurer and the insured equal parties to the
contract. The insurer provides the standard policy and the insured accepts
KEETON, supra note 14, § 55. An example of a particularly recent expansion of tort
law is the liability of providers of alcohol for injuries caused by drinkers. See, e.g.,
Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
138 See supra notes 9 & 18. For example, states have statutes to prevent unfair
practices and overreaching by insurers. States also have statutes dealing with
marketing practices and claims processing. See, e.g,, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 780-790.10
(Deering 1991); N.Y. INs. LAWS §§ 2401-2409; 2602-2610 (1990); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 175, § 2B (1990). See also Davis, Protecting Consumers from
Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook. An Empirical Look at the Simplification of
Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841 (1977).
139 See discussion supra note 18. See generally R. JERRY, supra note 2, § 22, at
73.
140 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 22 (1964); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 30 (1963).
141 A creditor's remedy depends on whether the claim is secured or unsecured. A
secured claim is one that has collateral protecting the debt. Such claims will be
satisfied first. Unsecured claims will receive a share of the remaining proceeds
according to a system of priorities listed in 11 U.S.C. § 507, a provision of the United
States Bankruptcy Code. See generally B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MANUAL Ch. 5 (1986).
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or rejects it. The insured cannot bargain. 142 Thus, if the insured knows of
the possibility of insurer insolvency and wants to protect itself by a
contract provision, it might find that it cannot do so. The insured can only
seek other insurance with a more stable company. The third-party claimant
cannot possibly protect itself because it does not choose to enter a
relationship with any insurer with regard to the loss at issue.
This discussion assumes that the insured knows of the danger of
insurer insolvency. The typical insured probably has no knowledge of the
need to protect against insurer insolvency.' 43 The typical insured may not
anticipate the possibility of insurer insolvency, or reliance on the state
insolvency prevention mechanisms may lull the insured into a false sense of
security.
Even if the insured knows of the possibility of insurer insolvency in
general and wishes to investigate the financial position of a potential
insurer, the typical insured lacks the knowledge and experience necessary
to evaluate financial statements of, and reports about, the insurer.
Solvency-related concepts such as reserves and surplus do not exist in most
business spheres other than banking and related financial institutions. 144
142 See R. KEErON & A. WIDIss, supra note 2, § 2.8(c). See generally Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 629 (1943).
143 In 1990, Caleb Fowler, President of CIGNA's property and casualty
companies stated that he had not seen a change in customer awareness of the
possibility of insurer insolvency. Albert Counselman, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Riggs, Counselman, Michaels and Downes, Inc., a Baltimore agency, stated
that he has seen a "miniscule change going on that is significant" in that there is some
heightened consumer awareness of the possibility of insurer insolvency. McIntyre,
Industry Executives Focus on Reform: Solvency, Workers Compensaion Top Panelists'
Agenda, Bus. INs., Oct. 22, 1990, at 81.
144 John Gardner, managing director of Insurance Solvency International Ltd., a
rating agency now owned by Standard and Poor's Corp., described ways that
insurance buyers can investigate the solidity of the insurer under consideration at the
17th Annual Captive Insurance Companies Association Inc. conference in 1990. Mr.
Gardner noted the presence of the rating system and stated that buyers should also
analyze the financials that are public. In the analysis the buyers should consider the
premiums to surplus ratio, the kind of business the company is doing, the rapidity of
the growth of the premium volume, adequacy of loss reserves as related to premium
volume and policyholder surplus, adequacy of total reserves, the net value of assets
and the quality of the assets and liabilities, the ability to raise money in a catastrophe,
underwriting losses compared to investment income, amount of reinsurance, ability
and willingness to pay, dividend payment, and size of the insurer. L. Kertesz, Buyers
Cautioned on Insurer Insolvency, Bus. INs., April 30, 1990, at 135. Obviously, this




Even sophisticated insureds would find the task of evaluating and
monitoring solvency substantial.
In addition, the insured does not have access to the data necessary for a
solvency evaluation. Nor would insurers want insureds to have access, on a
regular basis, to that information. The large numbers of potential insureds
make the possibility of periodic investigations by all insureds an efficiency
nightmare for insurers and insureds alike, even if the insureds can evaluate
the financial information and have access to it. Finally, the insured cannot
"mitigate" damages since an insured cannot purchase insurance after a loss
occurs.
If the burden for any loss not covered by the guaranty funds falls on
the insured, that party has the incentive to eliminate the risk. Yet, an
insured or claimant cannot eliminate or even minimize the risk. The only
risk shifting available to those parties may be, ironically, the purchase of
insurance to cover the possibility of insolvency or to double cover possible
losses. Basically, the loss falls on the insured or third-party claimant, the
parties who have traditionally received, and deserve to receive, protection.
Placing the loss on the insured furthers no socially beneficial goal. It
creates no 'impetus for improving solvency regulation and prevention.145
C. Placing a Tort Duty on Collateral Parties Is Fair and Socially
Beneficial
When one considers all of the factors of tort recognition, including the
social policy aspects, the argument for the establishment of a tort duty on
the part of the collateral parties to the insurance relationship is compelling.
Placing a duty on the collateral parties to investigate and monitor
reasonably the solvency of insurers with which they deal yields a much
more socially advantageous result. This duty logically extends the duty
already existing for brokers to exercise care in the placement of insurance
with solvent insurers. The proposed duty, however, requires affirmative
investigation and monitoring. This investigation and monitoring should, at
least, include an evaluation of NAIC data, Insurance Regulatory
Information System data, ratings service data, and any "other public
information and general information circulating within the industry. Thus
the duty requires a more thorough investigation than present law apparently
requires brokers to make. In addition, the duty continues past the
placement of the insurance or the commencement of the insurance
relationship. In the case of brokers and excess insurers, these parties owe
145 The only significant incentive for improving solvency regulation is the
possibility that an insurer will be assessed by the guaranty fund. See discussion at
notes 69-70 supra.
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the duty to the insureds with whom those parties deal. In the case of the
reinsurer, the insured may not be linked to the reinsurer by a specific
relation. Thus, all insureds of the insolvent insurer should have the
possibility of a recovery for a breach of the duty. Though present law
contains an analogous duty for brokers, a duty to investigate and monitor is
a novel concept with regard to excess insurers and reinsurers.
Courts can justify imposing a duty to investigate and monitor. First,
brokers, excess insurers and reinsurers profit from the business of
insurance, and specifically, in a parasitic way, from the existence of other
insurers in the industry. The smooth operation of the other insurer creates
a profit for the broker and creates a market for the excess insurer and
reinsurer. The insolvency of the other insurer creates the problem
addressed by this article.
Each of these collateral parties depends on the existence of insureds as
a class served by the industry. In any insurance relationship, the broker
and excess insurer are aware of the specific insured. They deal directly
with the insured. The reinsurer may not know of the particular insured, but
does know of the existence and involvement of insureds as a class.
Courts have long recognized that entities such as innkeepers and
carriers who provide services to the public have a duty to exercise
particular care in the rendering of those services. 146 The insurance industry
serves the public. Pound assumed the public nature of insurance in The
Spirit of Common Law in which he stated:
[W]e have taken the law of insurance practically out of the category of
contract, and we have established that the duties of public service
companies are not contractual, as the nineteenth century sought to make
them, but are instead relational; they do not flow from agreements which
the public servant may make as he chooses, they flow from the calling in
which he has engaged and his consequent relation to the public. 147
Numerous courts have noted the public nature of the industry. 148 Thus,
recognizing that collateral parties owe a duty to insureds with whom they
deal and to the public accords with prior principles.
146 See W. KEETON, supra note 14, §§ 28 & 56, at 161 & 373; Arterburn, The
Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411 (1927); Winfield, The
History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REV. 184 (1926). Courts have, on
the basis of policy and prevailing attitudes, recognized affirmative duties to act. See
W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 56 at 374; Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public
Good, 56 SO. CAL. L. REv. 103 (1982).
147 R. POUND, THE SPrr OF THE COMMON LAW 29 (1921).
148 See, e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668-
69, 456 P.2d 674, 680-81, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112-13 (1969); Bekken v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 293 N.W. 200, 210 (1940).
1112 [Vol. 52:1075
TORTREMEDYFOR INSUREDS
The duty owed by these public parties is a high duty that encompasses
nonfeasance.1 49 Imposing a duty on collateral parties to conduct a
reasonable investigation and monitoring of the solvency of insurers, and
imposing liability for a failure to abide by that duty accords with prior
treatment of public entities.
Each of the collateral parties have superior expertise for the analysis of
solvency data. The collateral parties are intimately familiar with topics
such as reserves, underwriting, and reinsurance. They understand the
effect and value of information regarding such concepts. These concepts,
after all, comprise the substance of the collateral parties' livelihood.
These parties have access to ratings services, trade publications, other
public financial information about insurers, and nonpublic information
which they glean from conversations with others in the industry. The
parties' position in the industry gives them the ability to spot strange
activities by insurers that might indicate a financially troubled insurer.150
Though, theoretically, the insureds have access to some of the same
information, collateral parties are much better equipped to evaluate the
information and make judgments as to insurer solvency.
Many commentators in the industry argue that collateral parties do not
have access to inside information. 151 Even if these parties have no inside
information, they have expertise superior to that of insureds to evaluate the
public information. 152 Others argue that solvency evaluation is a
"formidable matter, involving rules which can baffle even actuaries and
149 For example, common carriers must use great caution to protect passengers.
This duty has been desribed as "the utmost caution characteristic of very careful
prudent men." Pennsylvania v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451, 456 (1880). See also Ware v.
Yellow Cab, Inc., 193 Neb. 159, 225 N.W.2d 565 (1975).
150 Mazzuca, Expanded Role Urged for Brokers in Monitoring Insurer Insolvency,
Bus. INS., June 11, 1990, at 35. Illinois Deputy Governor John E. Washburn noted
that brokers "know the troubled companies long before the regulators do."Id.
151 Richard Peterson, outgoing head of the National Association of Insurance
Brokers, addressed the suggestion that brokers should guarantee the financial solvency
of insurers because brokers have access to inside information by stating that brokers
have no inside information and in fact have less information than regulators. Editorial
Comment, Producers & Insolvencies, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITING COMPANY:
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY/ EMPLOYEE BENEFITS EDITION, May 28, 1990, at 44
[hereinafter Editorial Comment]. However, brokers have more information than do
insureds. See Mazzuca, supra note 150; Katz, Solvency: Brokers, States, Feds Clash,
THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITING COMPANY: PROPERTY AND CASUALTY/ EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS EDITION, May 7, 1990, at 3, 61.
152 One commentator lists the following signals of possible insolvency that may
be available to brokers but arguably are not available to the public: Reinsurance
cancellation, discontinuation of lines of insurance, delays in processing, personnel
changes, mass cancellations, and large loss ratios. Harrison, supra note 69, at 528.
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insurance accountants. "153 This argument proves the point. If brokers,
excess insurers, and reinsurers are incapable of the evaluation, the typical
insurance consumer certainly is ill-equipped to evaluate the solvency status
of an insurer. The courts' application of a duty to brokers in the
procurement of insurance arises, in some part, from the brokers' presumed
knowledge and ability in the insurance industry. 154 Enlarging the duty to
include continuing monitoring is simply a greater recognition of that
superior ability.
Collateral parties should be required to evaluate relevant available data.
Without any increased information flow or other improvements, courts
could require brokers to investigate and evaluate NAIC information,
Insurance Regulatory Information System data and ratings services
information.
A strict liability standard makes full compensation to the hapless
insured a certainty. With a negligence standard there will be insureds who
are not compensated because the collateral parties are not negligent. The
negligence standard, however, allows consideration of the blameworthiness
of a particular collateral party. Such consideration will result in increased
investigation and monitoring of solvency as brokers attempt to avoid
liability by acting within the standard of care. A strict liability standard
may have the unwanted effect of discouraging monitoring because the
parties may feel that monitoring is unnecessary if they will be held liable
whether or not they monitor. 155
Imposing a duty on collateral parties to monitor insurer solvency
should provide an incentive to these segments of the industry to investigate
and monitor insurers with whom they deal. When these parties discover
problems with an insurer, they can cease doing business with the insurer,
notify the state regulator, or notify the insured. Notice to the insured
allows the insured to protect itself.156 Notice to the regulator allows the
153 B. HARNEIT, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS
§ 3.1511], at 3- 144 (1990).
154 B. HARNETT, supra note 153, § 3.15[1], at 3-146.
155 For a general discussion of strict liability, see W. KEETON, supra note 14,
§§ 75-81.
156 Once the broker calls the problem to the attention of the insured and the
insured continues to deal with the insurer, the broker cannot be responsible for future
losses occasioned by insurer insolvency. See Editorial Conunent, supra note 151,
which notes that some clients are more interested in the price of the insurance and will
place insurance with risky insurers if the cost is less. Richard Katten, President of the
Society of Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriters, noted that he was unable to
dissuade nine insureds from buying insurance from a troubled insurer. Id.
The possibility of slander, libel, or interference with contract actions would have
to be eliminated. David A. Olsen, Chief Executive Officer of Johnson and Higgins, a
leading insurance brokerage, has raised this issue as a reason not to apply a duty to
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regulator to take action to perhaps save the problem company and prevent
injury to the insureds. Refusing to deal with a particular insurer sends an
indirect message to insureds regarding the financial condition of the
insurer. This action also protects the collateral party, but will not always
protect the insureds and the public if they do not receive the indirect
message.
Once the collateral parties are aware of their duty and potential
liability, they can, individually and as a group, not only work within the
present regulatory framework for monitoring but can create better systems
of monitoring and investigation. They can work to improve the flow of
information within th6 industry and to and from the state regulator.
Centralizing the investigation and monitoring functions in collateral
parties as opposed to the vast number of insureds creates efficiencies. Most
brokers, excess insurers and reinsurers deal repeatedly with a set of
insurers and so can monitor those insurers' solvency for the many insureds
more efficiently than the insureds of those insurers. The cost of the
investigation and monitoring can be passed on to the insureds who are
receiving the protection. Any loss occasioned by a failure to abide by the
duty can also be absorbed as a cost of doing business and distributed as
such. The tort duty is simply a mechanism through which an insured can
be protected and pay for the protection since the insured cannot protect
itself.
Of course, the most efficient system would be one in which there is
one monitor. The state regulators historically have been viewed as the
centralized monitors. Yet, the collateral parties, industry insiders who have
potential liability for failing to abide by the monitoring duty, are more
capable and precise monitors. These parties have superior expertise and
motivation to maximize potential profit. Imposing a duty to monitor
solvency creates an environment in which industry insiders evaluate
information and ferret out problem insurers. The state regulator, though
not supplanted by the private monitors, gains from the efforts of the private
sector. The entire solvency prevention and detection mechanism is
improved. Imposing the duty on all collateral parties may very well prod
the industry as a whole to have one efficient solvency monitoring agency,
thus realizing the benefit of centralization. Bad business practices,
including fraud, 157 in a particular insurer cannot confinue under such
scrutiny by members of the industry and the state regulator. By putting the
brokers. Otis, New J&H Chief Eyes Int'l Options, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITING
COMPANY: PROPERTY AND CASUALTY/ EMPLOYEE BENEFITS EDITION, Nov. 19,
1990, at 25. Courts now impose a duty, however, on brokers with regard to the
placement of insurance, and slander, libel, and interference with contract actions do
not appear to be a problem.
157 See Failed Promises, supra note 11, at 16-20.
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burden on the collateral parties, the insured, at least in -situations in which
the insurer has been negligent, suffers no economic loss and the emotional
value of insurance can be retained in large part because insureds need not
doubt their security.
An evil of a tort duty of investigation is that financially troubled but
solvent insurers may be forced into insolvency. A broker, excess insurer,
or reinsurer decides, using good business judgment, not to deal with a
particular company. The lack of business may exacerbate the troubled
insurer's financial problems and cause it to spiral into insolvency. The
demise of an insurer that, absent the rule, might have salvaged its position
in the insurance industry, may not be a result that ultimately benefits
society. The overall result of increased monitoring, however, should be
positive.
V. THE STATE REGULATORS
Another responsible party in the insurer insolvency setting is the
state. 158 Each state has a department of insurance charged with the job of
monitoring insurers' financial stability and taking action when an insurer is
troubled.1 59 When an insurer becomes insolvent and an insured suffers a
loss, the insured may seek to hold the state responsible for negligent
158 Other parties include the state department of insurance and the individuals
comprising that department. A suit against a department of state government or against
individuals as agents of the state is, in most situations, a suit against the state.
Generally, an action is an action against the state if a judgment for the plaintiff Would
control the action of the state or would subject the state treasury to liability or would
otherwise affect the interests or rights of the state. See Holloway v. Dougherty County
School Sys., 157 Ga. App. 251, 277 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1981); High Grade Oil Co. v.
Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736, 737 (S.D. 1980). See generally CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST
STATE GOVERNMENT §§ 2.30-35 (1982); 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School,
and State Tort Liability § 68 (1988).
Though insureds might pursue actions against regulators personally, individual
employees of the government may not be capable of paying a substantial judgment if
the insureds prevail. Individuals may also benefit from official immunity. For a
discussion of official immunity, see CIVI. ACTIONS AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENT
§§ 6.1-6 (1982 & Supp. 1990); Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort
Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1977); McManis, Personal Liability of State
Officials Under State and Federal Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 821 (1975); Fox, The King
Must Do No Wrong: A Critique of the Current Status of Sovereign and Official
Immunity, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 177 (1979).
159 For example, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-050 (Baldwin 1991), defines the
Department of Insurance and the Commissioner; § 304.2-100 provides the
Commissioner's general powers; § 304.2-210 provides for the Commissioner's
examination of the financial condition of the insurers; and §§ 304.33-010 to -600
provide the rehabilitation and liquidation powers of the Commissioner.
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regulation of the insurer. 160 Indeed, the other actors in the insolvency
situation have repeatedly suggested that the state, not the brokers,
reinsurers, or excess insurers, is responsible when an insurer becomes
insolvent. 161
Imposing liability on the state is not difficult to justify. The state has
undertaken to regulate the financial condition of insurers with the goal of
protecting insureds. One can argue that because the state assumed a
protector's role no one else such as the insured, the" reinsurer, the excess
insurer, or the broker investigates and monitors the financial status of the
insurers. Everyone relies on the state to monitor solvency. Because the
state has undertaken to provide this service and thus induced reliance from
insureds and others, courts should hold that the state owes a duty of care to
those parties.
Other rationales also justify the imposition of tort liability upon the
state. As the regulatory framework presently exists, the state has easy
access to all manner of confidential financial information useful to the
analysis of insurer financial stability. The insurers file financial statements
with the state and the state has the ability and power to delve further into
the financial strength of an insurer. The state can even move to place the
insurer under supervision, rehabilitation, or liquidation. No other actor in
the insurer insolvency setting presently has such access to information or
powers to investigate or remedy the problem. The state can best protect
insureds and itself from liability by proper monitoring, investigation, and
action.
Imposition of liability on the state, as opposed to the insured, the
reinsurer, the excess insurer, and the broker, is also an efficient method of
improving regulation of insurers. If the burden to oversee insurers falls
only on the state, there is but one investigator. The state would then have
an incentive to improve the regulatory mechanism. If, however, all parties
160 Several suits against states brought on the basis of negligent regulation of
insurers have reached the courts. See, e.g., Perez v. Government of the Virgin
Islands, 847 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1988) (dismissed on the basis that the government
owed no duty to the public at large and the plaintiff was simply a member of the
public); Builders Transp., Inc. v. State, 421 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1988) (dismissed on
the basis of a statute that eliminated state liability for negligent supervision). See also
Roseville Community Hosp. v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d 583, 141 Cal. Rptr. 593
(1977), in which a hospital sued the state for failure to properly regulate a prepaid
health care service. The service became bankrupt and the service did not pay the
hospital. The California Court of Appeals dismissed the suit on the basis that the
action of the state was immune because the challenged action was discretionary.
161 See Mazzuca, supra note 150 (comments of Richard Petersen, National
Association of Insurance Brokers President); Katz, supra note 151 (comments of Earl
Pomeroy, NAIC President); Editorial Comment, supra note 151 (comments of Richard
Petersen).
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to the insurer insolvency situation, with the exception of the insured, are
potentially liable, the protection of the insured is maximized, but a less
efficient monitoring system may result.
The imposition of liability should cause states to improve the
regulation of insurer finances which in turn should result in fewer
insolvencies. If the new oversight is more expensive, the state can pass on
any increased costs to taxpayers as a whole, to insureds, or to insurers
licensed in the jurisdiction as a cost of doing business.
The case for state tort liability is defensible and logical. Yet, actions by
insureds against the state, on the basis of improper regulation, have two
significant doctrinal obstacles: sovereign immunity and the public duty
doctrine. The traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity allows no action
against a state. 162 Various rationales for the doctrine exist. These include
protection of the public treasury, the supremacy of the public interest over
the interest of an individual, the supremacy of the state, and the orderly
administration of government without interference from individuals and the
judiciary. 163
162 See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858). See also W.
KEnTON, supra note 14, § 131; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J.
1 (1924-25).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity probably was first developed in the reign of
Henry III and was described by the phrase, "The King can do no wrong." See
Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 141 (1922).
See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). One of the first cases
discussing the doctrine was Russell v. The Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 668, 100
Eng. Rep. 359, 360 (1788). In Russell, several members of the public sought to bring
an action against the county for a failure to adequately maintain the highways and
bridges. The court denied the plaintiffs the right to bring such an action.
Sovereign immunity prevents suits against the state and protects states from
liability even if the suit can be maintained. See Hattiesburg Realty Co. v. Mississippi
Highway Comm'n, 406 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1981), cert denied, sub nom. Pine Belt
Land Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 456 U.S. 961 (1982). For example,
some states allow proceedings against the state in board of claims proceedings but do
not waive sovereign immunity with regard to liability. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44.072 (Baldwin 1991). See also 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School,
and State Tort Liability § 82 (1988).
163 See Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788)
(public over the individual); Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 217 Kan. 279, 540 P.2d
66, 77 (1975), vacated on other grounds, 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015 (1976) (protect
the treasury); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 857-58, 280 N.W.2d 711,
717 (1979) (public over the individual); Berek v. Dade County, 396 So. 2d 756, 758
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)(orderly administration); O'Neill v. State Highway Dept.,
50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1, 5 (1967) (control of the judiciary); Holloway v. Dougherty




States never completely embraced absolute immunity because the
concept conflicted with the tort concept that liability flows to the
negligence and the constitutional concept that every individual is entitled to
a remedy for injury. 164 As a result, most jurisdictions have substantially
limited the doctrine.165
Though absolute immunity is now rare in the United States, many
jurisdictions retain an immunity for discretionary acts 166 as does the federal
government in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 167 The federal Act renders the
government liable for certain torts "in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 168 The federal
immunity provision retains sovereign immunity for: any claim based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused. 169
164 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). In Barker v. City of
Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480, 482 (1943), the New Mexico Supreme Court
stated:
It is almost incredible that in this modern age of comparative sociological
enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit
in the maxim, "the King can do no wrong,"should exempt the various branches of
the government from liability for their torts, and that the entire burden of damage
resulting from the wrongful acts of the governemnt should be imposed upon the
single individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire
community constituting the government, where it could be borne without hardship
upon any individual, and where it justly belongs.
165 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.50.250-.300 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 24-10-101 to -120 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-
901 to -929 (1990); NEV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.031-.39 (Michie 1989). There has been a
steady movement away from sovereign immunity. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal,
County, School, and State Tort Liability § 61 (1988).
166 The discretionary acts exception seems to be the preferred approach to
limiting sovereign immunity. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and
State Tort Liability § 111 (1988). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.50.250 (1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4001(1) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-15 (1990); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 25A.14 (1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103(2)(c) (1990);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8, -219(1)(a) (1987 & Supp. 1990).
167 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1990). See Wyant, The Discretionary Function
Exemption to Governmental Tort Liability, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 163 (1977).
168 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1990).
169 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1990).
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State statutes that provide discretionary act immunity often use similar
language. 170 For example, section 9.50.250 of the Alaska Statutes states, in
reference to the ability of individuals to bring an action against a state:
[A]n action may not be brought under this section if the claim
(1)... is an action for tort, and based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a state agency or an employee of the state, whether or not the
discretion involved is abused. 171
Discretionary act immunity is based at least in part on the goal of
insulating policy decisions from judicial review so that the judiciary does
not infringe upon the powers of a coordinate branch of government. 172
Discretionary act immunity -also prevents interference by private citizens
with basic governmental policy decisions and processes. 173
Federal and state courts have long struggled with developing a method
of determining whether particular conduct is discretionary for immunity
purposes. 17 4 In the recent case of United States v. Gaubert,175 the Supreme
170 See supra statutes cited in note 166.
171 ALASKA STAT. § 9.50.250 (1990).
172 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Johnson v. State, 69
Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980).
173 See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Liability, §§ 115-
17 (1988). See also Japan Air Lines Co. v. State, 628 P.2d 934 (Alaska 1981).
174 The Supreme Court has evaluated the issue several times prior to United
States v. ,Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991). In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15
(1953), the Supreme Court evaluated a claim of liability resulting from a government
administered fertilizer program. The Court stated:
[Discretionary act immunity] includes more than the initiation of programs and
activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room
for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that
acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance
,with official directions cannot be actionable . . . . In short, the alleged
"negligence" does not subject the Government to liability. The decisions held
culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level and
involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the
Government's fertilizer program.
Id. at 35-36, 42 (footnotes omitted).
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Involved the negligent
operation of a lighthouse which resulted in a barge running aground. The Court
phrased the policy/ operational distinction in the following way: "[O]nce [the Coast
Guard] exercised its discretion to operate a light. . . and engendered reliance on the
guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that
the light was kept in good working order. . . .".Id. at 69.
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Court attempted to distinguish discretionary and, therefore, immune acts
from nondiscretionary acts. The Gaubert opinion is especially useful in
analyzing claims of negligent regulation of insurers because Gaubert
involved the analogous claim that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
negligently regulated a savings association. Gaubert, chairman of the board
and majority shareholder, claimed that federal officials had been negligent
in selecting replacement officers and directors and in managing the savings
association on a daily basis after the federal officials perceived that the
savings association was in financial straits but before the officials placed it
in receivership. 176
In United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984), a case in which families, and representatives of
passengers killed when a plane crashed, sued the Federal Aviation Administration
claiming that the Administration erred in certifying that type of plane, the court held
that the discretionary act immunity applied because "Congress wished to prevent
'second guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort."Jd. at 798.
In Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), the Supreme Court
considered a suit by an infant for damage caused by polio contracted after receiving a
polio vaccine. The infant claimed that the National Institute of Health had acted
wrongly in licensing the production of the vaccine and in approving the release of the
particular lot of vaccine ingested by the infant. The Court held that discretionary act
immunity did not apply because the statutory framework left no room for policy
judgment with regard to the lot release and because the license to produce had been
issued without appropriate data as mandated by statute.
175 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991). For a discussion of the lower court opinion, see Note
United States v. Gaubert: Potential Liability for Federal Regulations Under the
"Discretionary Function" Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 S.D. L. REV.
180 (1991).
176 Id. at 1272. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the following:
1. the regulators "arranged for the hiring for IASA of . . . consultants on
operational and financial matters and asset management;"
2. the officials "urged or directed that IASA convert from a state-chartered
savings and loan to a federally-chartered savings and loan in part so that it could
become the exclusive government entity with power to control IASA;"
3. the regulators "gave advice and made recommendations concerning whether,
when, and how to place IASA subsidiaries into bankruptcy;"
4. the officials "mediated salary disputes between IASA and its senior officers;"
5. the regulators "reviewed a draft complaint in litigation" that IASA's board
contemplated filing and were 'so actively involved in giving advice, making
recommendations, and directing matters related to IASA's litigation policy that
they were able successfully to stall the Board of Directors' ultimate decision to file
the complaint until the Bank Board in Washington had reviewed, advised on, and
commented on the draft;"
6. the regulators "actively intervened with the Texas Savings and Loan
Department (IASA's principal regulator) when the State attempted to install a
supervisory agent at IASA;"and
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The Supreme Court explained that discretionary act immunity applies
when the state actor does some act that requires judgment or choice and
when the judgment or choice is made in consideration of public policy. 177
The requirement of an exercise of judgment or choice means that the
discretionary act immunity will not protect the government actors if a
statute or regulation mandates a particular action and the actor fails to
abide by that direction. 178 If, however, the statute, regulation, or other
directive allows discretion, the existence of the directive creates "a strong
presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves
consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the
regulations."179 To overcome the presumption, the challenger must show
that the actions are not grounded in the policy underlying the regime. 180
Applying this test to the actions of the federal officials in Gaubert, the
Court first concluded that the regulatory regime allowed much room for
discretion because a federal statute 181 gave the federal actors authority to
regulate federal savings and loan associations "giving primary
consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions in the United
States." 182 Thus, the situation was not one of action contrary to mandate.
Secondly, the Court concluded that all of the actions of which the
challenger complained involved "the kind of policy judgment that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield." 183 The day-to-day
decisions were undertaken to further the underlying policies of the
regulatory regime: to protect the solvency of the savings and loan industry
and this association in particular and also to bolster public confidence in
savings and loan associations. 184 Thus, discretionary function immunity
protected the challenged actions.
Several federal negligent regulation cases decided before Gaubert
delineated discretionary act immunity slightly differently but reached
equally disheartening results for potential insured plaintiffs.18 5 For
7. the regulators wrote to the board of directors "affirming that [the] agency had
placed that Board of Directors into office, and describing their mutual goal to
protect the FSLIC insurance fund."
Id. at 1276-77.
177 Id. at 1274.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1274-75 & n.7.
181 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1990).
182 Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. at 1277 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)).
183 Id. at 1278.
184 Id. at 1278 (discussing Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
185 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.
1990); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
1122 [Vol. 52:1075
TORTREMEDYFOR INSUREDS
example, in Emch v. United States,186 investors in a bank sued the
government for failure to "adequately supervise, examine and control the
condition, performance, operations, liquidity and solvency" of a bank and
as a result the bank became insolvent.' 8 7 In effect, this is the same claim
that insureds would pursue in the insol~ency setting. The court noted that
the existence of a discretionary act 'hltimately rests upon the
characterization of the challenged behavior as 'policy' or 'operations.'"' 188
The court stated:
In making this determination, relevant considerations include whether or
not the nature of the judgment exercised called for policy considerations,.
• . and whether the Act complained of is 'the result of a judgment or
decision which it is necessary that the Government official be free to make
without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged personal
liability., 89
The court concluded that the allegations were strictly claims of
"negligent performance of regulatory and statutory supervision or
monitoring of the bank entities" and therefore deserving of immunity. 190
The Emch court distinguished In re Frankin National Bank Securities
Litigation,191 in which the court found the day-to-day running of a bank to
be operational and not discretionary. 192 The Emch court noted that the facts
before it did not present operational actions. 193
State courts have applied discretionary act immunity to negligent
regulation claims in a fashion similar to the federal courts. 194 In Nordbrock
v. State, 195 bank shareholders claimed that the state had been negligent in
examining and supervising the financial condition of the bank and as a
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1387 (1991); Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank,
559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978); In re Franklin Nat'l
Bank See. Litig., 445 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Comment, Government
Liability for Defective Regulation in Bank Insolvency Cases, 20 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 911 (1980).
186 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980).
187 Id. at 525.
188 Id. at 527.
189 Id. (citation omitted).
190 Id. at 528.
191 445 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
192 Emch, 630 F.2d at 527 (referring to Franklin, 445 F. Supp. at 735).
193 Id. at 527-28.
194 See, e.g., Nordbrock v. State, 395 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1986); Security Inv.
Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 437 N.W.2d 439 (1989); Scott v. Department of
Commerce, 104 Nev. 580, 763 P.2d 341 (1988).
195 395 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1986).
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result the bank became insolvent. 196 The court analyzed the legislative
guidance given the regulator of banks and determined that the statutes gave
the regulator no specific guidelines on the methodology of monitoring.
Further, the regulator had no mandate of action to take when he or she
discovered a problem. Rather, the statutes gave the regulator discretion to
take several different courses of action. The court concluded that the
conduct of which the plaintiff complained constituted policy decisions
deserving of immunity.197
Though no court has evaluated the actions of a state to determine the
applicability of the traditional discretionary act immunity to insurer
financial regulation, one court has dealt with the issue obliquely. In
Roseville Community Hospital v. State,19s a hospital sued the state for
negligent regulation of a prepaid health care service. The hospital claimed
that as a result of the negligence of the state, and especially the Attorney
General, the health care service became bankrupt and the hospital suffered
the loss of unpaid bills for services rendered to plan participants. 199 The
hospital sought to show that the state and the Attorney General were liable
because, among other things, the conduct at issue was not discretionary. 2°°
Though not admitting that the discretionary act immunity case law
controlled, given the statutory immunity framework, the court found that
the actions of the Attorney General were clearly discretionary. The court
stated:
Law enforcement and regulatory activity entail continual choices among
priorities. A decision to devote available facilities and personnel to
selected areas and to abstain from active pursuit of others is a policy or
planning decision at a relatively high internal level. The hospital's injury
resulted from the discretion-impelled absence of a government activity,
not from the activity's negligent conduct. 201
These negligent regulation cases indicate that claims against state
insurance regulators for negligent regulation face a significant obstacle in
196 Id. at 873.
197 Id. at 876-77. See also Scott v. Department of Commerce, 104 Nev. 580, 763
P.2d 341 (1988) (claim of failure to regulate mortgage company resulting in
insolvency dismissed on basis of discretionary act exclusion); Security Inv. Co. v.
State, 231 Neb. 536, 437 N.W.2d 439 (1989) (claim of failure to regulate industrial
loan and investment company dismissed on basis of discretionary act exclusion).
198 74 Cal. App. 3d 583, 141 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1977).
199 Id. at 594, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
200 Id., 141 Cal'. Rptr. at 594.
201 Id. at 590, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
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discretionary act immunity states. The state courts often refer to the federal
cases for guidance on the issue of discretionary act immunity. 20 2
If state courts follow the teaching of Gaubert, an insured pursuing a
negligent regulation claim can succeed by proving that the state regulator
had a statutory or regulatory mandate to act in a certain manner and yet
acted contrary to that directive. If there is no mandate, the insured, to
succeed, must prove that the action taken was not taken in consideration of
the policies underlying the regulation. Insurance regulation exists for many
purposes including protection of insureds and the public from insurer
insolvency. 20 3 The insured, however, may not be able to prove that the
actions in question were not taken in furtherance of the goal of protection
of insureds and the public from insurer insolvency.
If a state court applies the policy/planning/operational test to determine
the applicability of discretionary act immunity, the insured must argue that
the acts were contrary to mandate or were operational. Generally, courts
applying this test state that acts are not operational unless the acts involve
the day-to-day operations of the insured. 204 Rarely will this be the case in
suits by insureds.
202 See, e.g., Nordbrock v. Iowa, 395 N.W.2d 872 (1986); Security Inv. Co. v.
Nebraska, 231 Neb. 536, 437 N.W.2d 439 (1989); Scott v. Department of Commerce,
104 Nev. 580, 763 P.2d 341 (1988). See generally 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal,
County, School, and State Tort Liability § 121 (1988).
203 See supra text parts I and I.
204 Another potential hurdle for insureds pursuing actions against states for
negligent regulation is governmental function immunity. A few states allow state
liability only if the activity in question is nongovernmental, a proprietary act. See,
e.g., Papenhausen v. Schoen, 268 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. 1978); Abruzzo v. State,
444 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (1981); American Trucking Assocs. v. Conway, 146 Vt. 579,
586-87, 508 A.2d 408, 413 (1986). The clear trend, however, is to eliminate the
governmental/proprietary distinction, especially in relation to suits against states per
se. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D, Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability §§ 87 &
92 (1988). See, e.g., Niles v. Healy, 115 N.H. 370, 343 A.2d 226 (1975).
In the jurisdictions applying the governmental/proprietary distinction, courts use
various tests to determine the character of the act in question and reach inconsistent
results that often reflect policy judgments. A test which apparently guides the decision
making of many courts in cases against states, and all forms of government entities,
focuses on whether the act performed is for the common good of the general public or
for the special benefit of the specific government unit. See, e.g., Imperial Prod. Corp.
v. Sweetwater, 210 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1954); Johnson v. Atlanta, 171 Ga. App. 296,
319 S.E.2d 506 (1984); Harris v. Des Moines, 202 Iowa 53, 209 N.W. 454 (1926).
Courts have interpreted activities expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by
statute or other law as governmental activities benefiting from immunity from liability.
See, e.g., Genzer v. Mission, 666 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
If a jurisdiction retains governmental function immunity, that immunity would, in
all probability, bar an action against the state on a negligent regulation theory. The
regulatory activities challenged are activities which perhaps are impliedly authorized
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The public duty doctrine presents another major obstacle to recovery
from the state. The public duty doctrine states that duties imposed on state
actors by statute are duties owed to the public in general but not to a
particular individual. 20 5 Thus, the individual cannot recover in a negligence
action because the state owes no duty, a required element of a tort cause of
action, to the insured plaintiff. The public duty doctrine remains the
majority rule,206 but a substantial number of courts have rejected the
doctrine altogether,20 7 or have limited the doctrine if the plaintiff can prove
but which certainly are designed to benefit the public at large. The activities are not
local in nature and do not generate a profit for the state insurance regulator or
department.
205 See Note, Governmental Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32
VILLANOVA L. REv. 505 (1987) [hereinafter Governmental Liability]; W. KEETON,
supra note 14, § 131, at 1049-50. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288
states: "[A] legislative enactment ... whose purpose is found to be exclusively . . .
(b) to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they are
entitled only as members of the public" does not create conduct for the imposition of
liability. The Comment to this section states:
[Certain] legislative enactments and regulations are intended only for the purpose
of securing to individuals the enjoyment of rights and privileges to which they are
entitled as members of the public, rather than for the purpose of protecting any
individual from harm. Thus a statute may be intended only to secure the public
right of unobstructed passage on the public highway, or freedom from excessive
noise or immoral conduct in the community. Under some circumstances, where an
individual has been interfered with in his exercise of such a public right, and as a
result has suffered special harm, distinct from that suffered by the rest of the
community, he may be entitled to maintain a tort action for the violation .... In
the ordinary case, however, harm suffered by such an individual is not within the
purpose of the provision, and the statute or regulation will not be taken to lay
down a standard of conduct with respect to such harm.
For other discussions of the doctrine, see Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing
Governmental Unit From Tort Liability on 77Teory that Only General, Not Particular
Duty Was Owed Under Circumstaices, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1194 (1985); 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 4(8) (1966 & Supp. 1991). For particular applications of the doctrine,
see Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 303 (1977); Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94
HARV. L. REV. 821 (1981).
206 See Governmental Liability, supra note 205, at 507 n.10; Perez v.
Government of the Virgin Islands, 847 F.2d 104, 105 (3d Cir. 1988). For examples of
application of the public duty rule, see Gordon v. Bridgeport Hous. Auth., 208 Conn.
161, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988); Cunningham v. District of Columbia, 584 A.2d 573
(D.C. App. 1990); In re Estate of Vasconcelles, 170 Ill. App. 3d 404, 524 N.E.2d 720
(1988); Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1983).
207 Some states have clearly rejected the doctrine. See, e.g., City of Kotzebue v.
McLean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Alaska 1985); Pritchard v. Ariz., 788 P.2d 1178 (1990);
Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664
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the existence of a special duty or relationship. 20 8 Generally, courts
recognize the existence of a special duty if the plaintiff proves that the
governmental entity or agents induce reliance by affirmative action and
should foresee injury to the plaintiff if the entity ceases the affirmative
action or acts negligently. 209 One situation in which courts recognize a
special duty is that in which legislation indicates a clear intent to protect an
identifiable class of persons and the plaintiff is a member of that class. 210
If a jurisdiction does not recognize the public duty doctrine, the
insured suing the state must establish the existence of a tort duty and
breach of that duty in accord with traditional tort principles. If, however,
the jurisdiction follows the public duty doctrine, the doctrine may act as an
absolute bar to any insured's claim against the state. If the jurisdiction
recognizes the special duty limitation of the public duty rule, the insured
must establish the existence of a special duty.
The only court to review an insured's claim that the government failed
to regulate an insurer properly, in light of the public duty doctrine,
determined that the doctrine barred the action. In Perez v. Government of
the Virgin Islands,211  the plaintiff claimed that the Insurance
Commissioner's office was so understaffed that it could not properly
monitor insurers as required by statute. As a result of the negligence, the
insured's automobile liability insurance policy became worthless when the
insurer became insolvent.2 12 The plaintiff argued that tie statutory scheme
of insurance regulation created a special relationship between the
government and its citizens. 213
The Third Circuit determined that the fact that the statutes required
automobile liability insurance, and required the Insurance Commissioner to
monitor and approve insurers, did not create any special relationship or
duty on the part of the government to protect insureds from the "fiscal
(Iowa 1979); Stewart v. Schmeider, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980); Schear v. Board of
County Comm'rs of Bernalillo, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984); Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Brennen v. City
of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979).
208 See Governmental Liability, supra note 205, at 516-17; Comment, The Special
Duty Doctrine: A Just Compromise, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 409 (1987). For an example
application, see Lowe v. Patterson, 492 So. 2d 110 (La. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied,
496 So. 2d 355.
209 See 57 AM. JUR. 2D, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability
§ 142 (1988). See also Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984).
210 See Governmental Liability, supra note 205, at 515-16; Comment, supra note
208, at 420. See generally 57 AM. JUR 2D, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort
Liability § 143 (1988).
211 847 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1988).
212 Id. at 104-05.
213 Id. at 107.
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irresponsibility" of insurers. The court stated that the statutes imposed
discretionary authority on the Commissioner. The statutes did not mandate
duties which conceivably could be the basis of an action for negligence.
For example, the court noted that the statute required the Commissioner to
examine and investigate the affairs and records of a domestic insurer only
"as often as he deems advisable." 214 Perhaps the legislation required the
Commissioner to bar the insurer if the insurer did not file an annual report,
but the court was unwilling to find from this fact that the Commissioner
might be liable for any injury which resulted from financial problems that
analysis of the annual report might have disclosed. 215 Finally, the court
noted that a statutory provision specifically stated that the insurer, the
insured, and their representatives have "the duty of preserving inviolate the
integrity of insurance." 216 Because the provision did not mention the state,
the court was unwilling to include the state in that group.217
Other negligent regulation cases have received a similar reception when
the issue is the public duty doctrine. 218 For example, in Metzger v.
Superintendent of Building & Loan Associations,219 mortgagors brought an
action against the state claiming that the state negligently regulated the
association and as a result the association raised rates to unlawful levels.
The court stated:
[B]reach of a duty imposed by statute for the benefit of the public at large
does not give rise to a claim for relief by an individual citizen harmed as a
result of the breach. While claims against defendants in the private sector
for such violations are widely recognized, such as in the products liability
field, this court is unwilling to extend the theories to the general statutory
duties of governmental entities and employees.220
In light of Perez and Metzger, an insured's claim of improper
regulation in a public duty or special duty jurisdiction has a significant and
substantial obstacle to recovery. An insured perhaps can overcome the
obstacle by citing legislation, if legislation exists in the particular
jurisdiction, which more clearly imposes mandatory duties on the state for




2 1 7 Id.
218 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Department of Banking and See. v. Brown, 605
S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1980); Metzger v. Superintendent of Bldg. & Loan Assocs., 31 Ohio
App. 3d 212, 510 N.E.2d 404 (1986).
219 31 Ohio App. 3d 212, 510 N.E.2d 404 (1986).
220 Id. at 213; 510 N.E.2d at 405.
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The Third Circuit in Perez stated, after denying the plaintiff's claim,
that the court was "not unsympathetic" to the insured and similarly situated
citizens.2 21 Perhaps such sympathy will lead courts to find immunity
inapplicable to claims of insureds, and to find a duty owed by the state to
the insureds of insolvent insurers.
VI. CONCLUSION
An insured of an insolvent insurer should be allowed the possibility of
recovering in tort for all damage resulting from the insolvency from the
broker, the excess insurer, the reinsurer, and the state, if those parties have
negligently monitored the solvency of the insurer. If the courts allow such
recovery, they must recognize that each of these parties owes a tort duty to
insureds to monitor the solvency of insurers with whom the collateral
parties and the state deal.
One basis for recognizing such far-reaching potential liability is that
insureds deserve compensation and protection. Insureds cannot protect
themselves against insolvency in any particular situation or in general.
Insureds lack the bargaining ability, information and expertise to protect
themselves from insurer insolvency. Placing the loss on insureds is,
therefore, unjust and inefficient.
Imposing a tort duty -on the collateral parties and the state is more
efficient and fair. Recovery from the state should be allowed because
society entrusts the states with the job of regulating insurers to protect the
public. The state should be liable for negligence in carrying out this
regulatory task. The collateral parties have knowledge of the possibility of
insurer insolvency, the expertise and information to evaluate insurer
solvency, and the ability to distribute any loss caused by insurer insolvency
or by the process of monitoring. The collateral parties profit from the
insurance industry and are capable of implementing changes within the
industry.
Tort liability should result in increased industry self-regulation, which,
in turn, should decrease the incidence of insolvencies, thus benefiting all
insureds. All insureds eventually contribute to any resulting increased
industry costs. Tort liability should also allow some individual insureds to
avoid tremendous loss by providing recovery from negligent collateral
parties.
Recognition of such tort liability may constitute the only effective
mechanism to spur appropriate insolvency prevention. Without such
221 Perez v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 847 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir.
1988).
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prevention, the insured suffers economic loss and emotional loss in that
insureds cannot purchase peace of mind.
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